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ABSTRACT  In this paper we identify elements in Marx’s economic and political 
writings that are relevant to contemporary critical discourse analysis (CDA). We argue 
that Marx can be seen to be engaging in a form of discourse analysis. We identify the 
elements in Marx’s historical materialist method that support such a perspective, and 
exemplify these in a longitudinal comparison of Marx’s texts.  
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Introduction  
This paper has developed as one part of a wider project: the critique of 
language in new capitalism. By ‘new capitalism’ we mean the emergent form of 
capitalism, variously referred to as ‘globalisation’, ‘the global economy’, ‘the 
knowledge economy’, ‘ the information society’, and so forth. It is the form of 
capitalism which is currently emerging as a new and dominant form of social 
organisation on a global scale (Jessop, 2000). Amongst its more salient characteristics 
are the importance of international and ‘global’ institutions, and the ways in which the 
actions of such institutions are integrated with national, regional and local scales; and 
more particularly, a systemic emphasis on commodifying the most intimate aspects of 
human existence, including thought, language, attitudes, and opinions (Graham, 1999, 
2000). 
There are various ways in which language and other discursive artefacts (for 
instance, imagery) are of greater importance to this new socio-economic formation 
than to its predecessors. Let us for instance briefly pursue this argument with respect 
to its ‘knowledge-based’ nature. The very idea of a ‘knowledge-based’ economy, and 
its counterpart ‘information society’, entails a discourse-based economy and society, 
in the sense that these more or less valuable knowledges are inevitably produced, 
exchanged and consumed as discourses. Put more plainly, more or less valuable 
knowledges presuppose more and less valued ways of knowing, which are always 
institutionally defined as such in discourse (Graham, 1999, 2000). Moreover, the cycle 
of knowledge production, exchange, and consumption includes on the one hand the 
‘operationalization’ of knowledges (discourses) as social practices, as ways of acting 
and interacting; and on the other hand the ‘inculcation’ of knowledges (discourses) as 
ways of knowing one’s self and the world, as ways of being, as identities (Graham, 
2000, p. 141).  
Language is intricately involved throughout this cycle: the operationalization 
of discourses, includes the creation of new genres through ‘generic chaining’, or 
generic convergence (Fairclough, 2000); the subtle but profound effects wrought by 
new ways of mediating linguistic and discursive exchanges (Graham, 2000); and the 
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inculcation of discourses, including the creation of new styles, new discursive ways of 
being, knowing, and having; and new artefacts and institutions of knowledge 
(Fairclough 2000; Graham 2000). At every point in this cycle, language is both 
implicated and exposed as a decisive element. The diffusion, operationalization and 
inculcation of discourses is crucial in the integration of different scales of economic 
activity. If the socio-economic order is discourse- and language-based in this sense – 
and we must assume it is – understanding of it, resistance to it, and struggle against it 
must also incorporate a significant discursive element (Melucci 1996). We shall not 
attempt an extended rationale for the critique of the new capitalism here – we assume 
that readers will be familiar with evidence of alarming disparities between, on the one 
hand familiar claims to enhance human progress, welfare, poverty-relief, and so forth 
through “economic growth”, and on the other hand an increasingly pronounced gap 
between rich and poor, declining economic and social standards for millions if not 
billions of people, major damage to both ecological systems and the social fabric, and 
so forth (cf. Bauman, 1998; Graham, 1999; Hart, 1999; Jessop, 2000; Kennedy, 1998; 
Saul, 1997). The important point to make for this paper is that the critique of the new 
capitalism is incomplete without a significant element of language critique. One might 
say the same about any form of capitalism, or indeed about other socio-economic 
systems. But if the resources of discourse, and in particular language, do indeed, as we 
suggest, carry more weight in the constitution and reproduction of the emergent form 
of global capitalism, then language critique becomes correspondingly more important.  
Why then go back to Marx? It is uncontentious that Marx’s critique of 
capitalism has been the single most substantial and influential critique, and we believe 
that Marx’s method remains important in understanding the emergent new capitalism. 
What has not been sufficiently recognized however is the significant place of critique 
of language in the critical method which he applied to capitalism. Indeed, we argue 
that Marx’s method includes elements of what is now generally known as ‘critical 
discourse analysis’. Our aim in looking at Marx as a discourse analyst ‘avant la lettre’ 
is first of all to establish this, and secondly to ask whether there are insights we can 
take from Marx which are of theoretical and/or methodological value in developing a 
critical analysis of language as part of the contemporary critique of capitalism. We 
shall argue that there are. We believe that this sort of critique should start from a view 
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of language as an element of the material social process which is dialectically 
interconnected with other elements (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999, Fairclough 2000, 
Graham 1999, 2000) - that the production of social life (both economic production 
and production in non-economic domains) is based within the articulation together of 
diverse elements and aspects of sociality into relatively stable configurations which 
always essentially and inherently include language (or more generally, discourse). 
This view stands in contrast with the predominant approach to the sociality of 
language within linguistics, which has consisted in a double movement of first 
abstracting language from its material interconnectedness with the rest of social life, 
treating language as an “ideal” and non-material entity, and then construing the 
sociality of language as relations ‘between’  language – so constituted as an object of 
linguistic theory and analysis – and society, as if these were two separately constituted 
realities which subsequently, or even accidentally, come into contact with each other. 
What emerges in particular from our reading of Marx is precisely his emphasis on the 
dialectical interconnectivity of language and other elements of the social which we 
believe is an essential basis for a form of language critique which can do full justice to 
social power of language in new capitalism without reducing social life to language, 
removing language from material existence, or reifying language.  
Of course, to speak of Marx’s method as if it were a monolithic and 
homogenous ‘thing’ is to do a great violence to the perspective. His approach was 
profoundly transdisciplinary, many-faceted, and ever-changing, both drawing on and 
inspiring studies in political theory, political economy, jurisprudence, philosophy, 
social theory, anthropology, and historiography. Further, to view the whole of Marx as 
a theoretical monolith is to ignore or disallow the development of thought and the path 
of self-clarification common to any intellectual career. Here we examine Marx’s 
development with the assumption that it can, at least in part, be viewed as the 
development of a critical understanding of just how central language is to social 
organisation, social change, and to the reproduction of social forms, as well as to 
understanding relations between these phenomena.  
Critical Discourse Analysis: A brief overview 
 5 
The perspective from which we approach the wider research project and the 
reading of Marx is ‘critical discourse analysis’ (Fairclough 1992, 1995, Fairclough & 
Wodak 1997). Critical discourse analysis  (hereafter CDA) analyses language as 
‘discourse’, which we take to mean that language is conceived as one element of the 
social process dialectically interconnected with others along the lines sketched out 
above. It is a ‘critical’ analysis of discourse in that it sets out precisely to explore these 
often opaque dialectical interconnections within the tradition of critical social science. 
That is, it shares the concern of critical social science to show how socio-economic 
systems are built upon the domination, exploitation, and dehumanisation of people by 
people, and to show how contradictions within these systems constitute a potential for 
transforming them in progressive and emancipatory directions. In our understanding, 
CDA differs from other critical (eg Foucaultian, “post-modern”, “post-structural”, 
“social constructivist”, etc) approaches to discourse in its view of spoken, written, and 
multimediated texts. CDA views texts as a moment in the material production and 
reproduction of social life, and analyses the social ‘work’ done in texts as a significant 
focus of materialist social critique.  
CDA builds upon ‘critical linguistics’ (Fowler et al 1979) by centering the 
conceptualization of language as ‘discourse’ and more explicitly locating critical 
language analysis within critical social science (Fairclough 1989, 1992). Critical 
linguistics and CDA have both been shaped by Marxism, especially twentieth century 
‘western Marxism’ (Fairclough & Wodak 1997). Although the analysis of language in 
relation to the power relations and ideologies of capitalism has been a concern 
throughout, there has more recently developed a particular concern with contemporary 
processes of socio-economic change and the ways in which language figures within 
them (Fairclough 1992, 2000; Graham 2000). The ‘language in new capitalism’ 
project (Fairclough et al 2000) is currently giving a tighter focus to this work, and a 
more explicit political orientation, linking CDA more closely to contemporary 
analyses of the form and contradictions of new capitalism, and the forms of resistance 
and struggles for change which are developing in response to it.  
Critical research on new capitalism is, by nature and necessity, 
interdisciplinary. We envisage critical discourse as working within such a conjunction 
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in a ‘transdisciplinary’ way (Fairclough 2000); that is, entering a dialogue with other 
disciplines, theories, and methods, putting their logic to work in developing critical 
discourse analysis as a theory and method in relation to the particular object of 
research. The relationship between object of research, theory, and method is 
conceived of as a dynamic relationship, not a matter of pre-existing theory and method 
being ‘applied’ to a new object, but of theory and method (in out case, the theory and 
method of critical discourse analysis) evolving in the encounter with the object of 
research, whose construction is in turn ongoingly developed through this process of 
evolution. Marxism and the work of Marx in particular is obviously a significant 
partner-in-dialogue for critical discourse analysis given the focus on capitalism. We 
therefore see this paper as initiating a process of putting a Marxist logic to work in 
developing critical discourse analysis as theory and method to enhance its capacity to 
address the object of research.  
It may help to clarify our broader objectives and approach if we compare them 
them recent work on ‘language ideology’ (Woolard and Scheifflin, 1994) in 
anthropological linguistics, especially the recent work by Bauman and Briggs (2000) 
in their study of the language ideologies of Locke and Herder. They see the language 
philosophies of Locke and Herder as contrasting, but in some ways complementary, 
language ideologies tied to projects of regulating the ‘metadiscursive order’ – 
controlling the social distribution and hierarchisation of forms of discourse – within 
the wider project of legitimizing the emergent bourgeois social order, including its 
exclusions and inequalities. Their objective is ‘to increase our reflexive understanding 
of the historical foundations of modern ideologies of language and metadiscursive 
practices more generally’ (p. **). Bauman and  Briggs’ focus on contributions of 
philosophy to the constitution of metadiscursive regulation obviously contrasts with, 
but is perhaps complementary to, our focus on contributions of theory to the critique 
and, more importantly, to the transformation of the current global capitalist order. Our 
overall objective is clearly different: it is to increase our understanding of what 
language critique can contribute, not only to understanding, but also to transforming, 
contemporary capitalism through exploring how Marx applied language critique to the 
capitalist order of his day.1  
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We proceed by outlining the origins and development of Marx’s method, 
highlighting the explicit and implicit role of language as his method matures over the 
course of a life. We draw these elements together by focusing on examples from six of 
Marx’s works. A caveat to this paper is that it is not a critical analysis of Marx’s 
discourse. Rather, it is an exposition of the elements in Marx that we believe can 
contribute theoretically and methodologically to CDA, and, more specifically, to 
CDA’s contribution to the transdisciplinary project of critically engaging 
contemporary capitalism.  
Marx, classical scholarship, and language: An historical contextualisation 
Critics of Marx who suggest that he lacked a systematic ‘theory of language’ 
(e.g. Cook, 1982, p. 530;  Lepschy, 1985) overlook the nature of nineteenth century 
scholarship. While much attention has been directed towards understanding the 
historical links between Kant, Hegel, and Marx (e.g. Adorno, 1973, 1994; Bloom, 
1943; Cook, 1982; Hook, 1928a; Warminski, 1995), little attention has been given to 
the broader historical tapestry in which these writers appear as pivotal figures in the 
history of western thought (Bloom, 1943). The contributions of Marx, Hegel, and 
Kant cannot be understood without taking into account the enduring influence of 
classical scholarship in general (Bloom, 1943). Nor can we grasp the centrality of 
language critique to Marx’s method without taking into account nineteenth century 
scholarship in general, and, in particular, his philosophical and juridical education in 
Germany at a time when Hegel’s philosophy was considered to be a revolutionary 
intellectual force (cf. Bloom, 1943; Colletti, 1975, p. 46; Hook, 1928, p. 114; Tucker, 
1972, pp. xvii-xviii). An understanding of language was central to scholarship during 
the time Marx studied. It was, in fact, the foundation of classical scholarship (Adorno, 
1973, p. 56, 1994, pp. 18-21, pp. 116-118; Cook, 1982, p. 530; Grote, 1872).  
In the following section, we outline three conceptual elements that are central 
to understanding the discursive aspects of Marx’s critical method. The elements we 
have chosen to highlight are: the doctrine of abstraction, Aristotle’s conception of 
dialectic, and the late-eighteenth to mid-nineteenth century conceptions of ideology, 
the philosphical counterpart of post-revolutionary political economy in France and 
 8 
Germany. When we trace these themes out in their historical significance, what we 
find in Marx’s formulation is an intense mixture of naturalism and humanism 
intertwined with a fundamentally discursive approach to analysing social phenomena.  
The ‘doctrine of abstraction’ and its significance to Marx’s thought 
Hegel substitutes the act of abstraction revolving within itself for these fixed 
abstractions; in so doing he has the merit, first of all, of having revealed the source of 
all these inappropriate concepts which originally belonged to separate philosophers, of 
having combined them and of having created as the object of criticism the exhaustive 
range of abstraction rather than one particular abstraction. We shall later see why 
Hegel separates thought from the subject; but it is already clear that if man is not 
human, then the expression of his essential nature cannot be human, and therefore 
that thought itself could not be conceived as an expression of man’s being, of man as 
a human and natural subject, with eyes, ears, etc., living in society, in the world, and in 
nature. (Marx, 1844/1975, p. 398) 
While much is made of Marx’s materialist critique of Hegel, rarely is it 
acknowledged that it merely extends a debate that has continued for thousands of 
years (Colletti, 1975, pp. 22-24). The very earliest written record we have in the 
Western tradition of antagonism between idealism and materialism can be found in 
Aristotle’s arguments against Plato’s ‘ideal forms’ (Colletti, 1975, p. 24; Grote, 1872, 
pp. 29-30; Lawson-Tancred, 1998, p. xxvii).2 It is here that we find Aristotle 
deploying the concept of abstraction in an attempt to reconcile “ideal” and “material” 
aspects of human existence. The notion of ‘abstraction’ as being essential to human 
cognition has its origin in Aristotle’s materialist critique of Plato’s idealism.3 Central 
to Aristotle’s rebuttal of idealism is his insistence that the ‘Forms of material things 
are not separate realities, yet we seem to be able to consider them without considering 
the matter or without considering other concrete features of material things’ 
(Weinberg, 1968, p. 1). This of course was in contradiction to Plato and his followers 
who held that form had a separate existence from matter, and that humans were able 
to these separate aspects because of knowledge gathered during a previous existence, 
thus rendering a theory of abstraction unnecessary (p. 1). Aristotle argued against this, 
claiming that because ‘form and matter are joined in physical objects’,  a theory of 
abstraction is ‘both possible and necessary’ (p. 1).4 Aristotle’s materialist theory of 
cognition is the foundation upon which the scholastics developed their ‘doctrine of 
abstraction’ (p. 2).  
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The doctrine remained the fundamental tool for reasoning about questions of 
cognition throughout the height of the scholastic period, persisting throughout the 
enlightenment and beyond (McKeon, 1928, pp. 425-426). It was also an object of 
contention, and thus underwent all the usual twists and turns that such pivotal ideas do 
(Randall, 1940). Descartes’ ontological dualism owes its existence to the doctrine of 
abstraction, as does Kant’s theory of the a priori.5 Logical positivism is similarly 
derived. But essentially, Aristotle’s formulation, as it was passed down by the 
scholastics, remained intact until Hegel reshaped it in a very specific way: by adding 
the concept of genesis – change over time. This was in contradistinction to doctrinaire 
abstraction, as it was most fully developed  by the scholastics, which was concerned 
with the immutable and Universal attributes of isolated things, the Universal 
characteristics of objective matter. Hegel, on the other hand, added the dimension of 
social time – history – and formulated a theory of abstraction that assumed the effects 
of dynamic, antagonistic, and antithetical social processes throughout history, thus 
bequeathing us the concept of the evolving ‘Idea’ (Hook, 1928, p. 117; Marx, 
1844/1975, p. 398, McTaggart, 1893).  
The significance of Hegel’s contribution cannot be overestimated. Rather than 
being confined to  a dry logic of “things”, Hegel reshaped the static tool of abstraction 
into a dynamic system that describes how universal categories themselves evolve over 
time (McTaggart, 1893, p. 490).6 For Hegel, this change over time – this evolution of 
historical consciousness – was a matter of thought becoming conscious of itself 
through dynamic, contradictory, and interdependent processes of abstraction working 
upon themselves, the historical culmination of which is to be ‘Absolute Knowledge or 
Spirit knowing itself as Spirit’ (Hegel, 1807/1966, p. 808).7 History is thus ‘the 
process of becoming in terms of knowledge, a conscious self-mediating process –
Spirit externalized and emptied into Time’ (p. 807). The ‘goal’ of History is ‘the 
revelation of the depth of spiritual life’ (p. 808). 
It is precisely these “mystical” aspects in Hegel that drive Marx’s pivotal 
critique of idealism. For Hegel, ‘self-realising self-consciousness’, the historical 
movement of abstract thought, determines the course of human history (Marx, 
1846/1972, p. 118). For Marx the opposite is true: human life – social activity – 
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determines the form, nature, and consequences that our conscious abstractions take 
(Marx, 1846/1972, p. 118; Warminski, 1995, p. 118).8 But Marx’s is no simple 
inversion of Hegel, ‘that is what the Young Hegelians do and what he criticizes them 
for’ (Warminski, 1995, p. 120). His approach is, rather, ‘a full-scale “deconstruction” 
of both consciousness and life and the “relation” between them’ (1995, p. 120). But  
for Marx, language and social consciousness are identical – ‘language is practical 
consciousness’ (1846/1972, p. 122); the one cannot be practically distinguished from 
the other:  
Language does not transform ideas, so that the peculiarity of ideas is dissolved and 
their social character runs alongside them as a separate entity, like prices alongside 
commodities. Ideas do not exist separately from language. (Marx, 1857/1973, p. 163)  
For Marx, Hegel’s (1910) Phenomenology is ‘concealed and mystifying criticism’ 
because it hides the social character of our ideas, the social nature of shared 
abstractions (Marx, 1844/1975, p. 385). But he sees that Hegel has grasped an 
important feature of abstraction: genesis, ‘the moving and producing principle’, the 
dynamic, processual, intrinsically productive nature of human social activity which, 
once given a materialist orientation, is the basis of Marx’s critical method (1844/1975, 
p. 386).  
Dialectics: Outlines of a method 
Dialectics—literally: language as the organon of thought—would mean to attempt a 
critical rescue of the rhetorical element, a mutual approximation of thing and 
expression, to the point where the difference fades. Dialectics appropriates for the 
power of thought what historically seemed to be a flaw in thinking: its link with 
language, which nothing can wholly break […]. Dialectics seeks to mediate between 
random views and unessential accuracy, to master this dilemma by way of the formal, 
logical dilemma. But dialectic inclines to content because content is not closed, not 
predetermined by a skeleton; it is a protest against mythology. (Adorno, 1973, p. 56) 
The classical formulation of dialectical method is a relational, socially 
grounded approach to analysing assertions. Its methods and categories are derived 
from language in use, from ‘common speech’; its objective is to challenge “common 
sense” (Grote, 1872, pp. 385-390). In ancient Greece, it has been argued, dialectical 
method was the essence of ‘free speech and free thought’, and thus was considered to 
be the essence of democracy (Berti, 1978). If Hegel’s dynamic treatment of 
abstraction is the foundation of Marx’s theoretical perspective, Aristotle’s dialectic 
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may be viewed similarly as his analytical method. As defined by Aristotle, dialectic is 
a critical linguistic method formulated to challenge the dogmas of received wisdom 
(Adorno, 1973; Grote, 1872, p. 384). A crucial aspect of Aristotlean dialectic is its 
relational logic.9 Various misunderstandings of relational logic have led to 
antithetical, ‘substantialist’ (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 4) readings of important categories in 
Marx’s work, ‘social class’ for example. From a relational perspective, any property 
we care to identify as a significant ‘distinction’ in social life, including social class, ‘is 
nothing other than difference, a gap, a distinctive feature, in short, a relational 
property existing only in and through its relation with other properties’ (Bourdieu, 
1998, p. 6).10 Bourdieu’s relational logic, like Marx’s, is fundamentally Aristotlean.  
In its classical form, dialectical argument is organised around  Aristotle’s 
Categories, the most fundamental of these being Entia (Grote, 1872, p. 90). ‘Entia’ 
are defined relationally within propositions, and while the term has a rough 
correspondence to “Essences” or “Substances”, it is best viewed as a gradation of 
essences, as “more and less essential” essences (Grote, 1872, p. 90; Lawson-Tancred, 
1998, pp. xxviii-xxvix).11 But the most important of the Categories is Relation. 
Considered in the most comprehensive sense, all of Aristotle’s categories ‘are 
implicated and subordinated to Relation’, even the fundamental category of “essence” 
(Grote, 1872, pp. 115-120). Relation, ‘understood in the large sense which really 
belongs to it, ought to be considered as an Universal, comprehending and pervading 
all the Categories’ (p. 120). Relations in Aristotle are organised around the concept of 
Relata (pp. 100-104). Relata are ‘of other things, or are said to be in some manner 
towards something else’ (p. 100). They are ‘so designated in virtue of their relation to 
another Correlata; the master is master of a servant – the servant is servant of a 
master’ (Grote, 1872, p. 101; cf. also Hegel, 1807/1966, pp. 228-240; Marx, 
1844/1975b). Relata and Correlata are mutually defining; they are ‘simul naturâ. If 
you suppress one of the pair, the other vanishes’ (Grote, 1872, p. 102). It is no 
selective contrivance on our part that we choose to highlight the relational aspect of 
Aristotle’s system. Aristotle describes Relation, ‘not as one amongst many distinct 
Categories, but as implicated with all the Categories’ (Grote, 1872, p. 126).12 And this 
primacy of the relational in Aristotle can also be clearly seen throughout Marx.  
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Dialectical arguments, then, are primarily concerned with language. They have 
‘for their province words and discourse; they are ... powers or accomplishments of 
discourse’ (p. 384). The objects of dialectic are ‘Endoxa’, ‘premises, propositions and 
problems’ which are ‘borrowed from some one among the varieties of accredited or 
authoritative opinions’ – from ‘a particular country’, ‘an intelligent majority’ or from 
‘a particular school of philosophers or wise individuals’ (p. 383).13 They are found 
‘exclusively in the regions of ... received opinions’, and are supported to varying 
degrees by ‘the mass of opinions and beliefs floating and carrying authority at the 
same time’ (p. 389). In any given community, endoxic propositions are often 
contradictory, and will have many meanings and interpretations within that 
community. They are an important focus for dialectical investigation for precisely this 
reason. Each individual, as they mature, ‘imbibes these opinions and beliefs insensibly 
and without special or professional teaching … and it is from them that the reasonings 
of common life ... are supplied’ (1872, p. 385). In other words, endoxa form the basis 
of what we call “common sense”.14 Dialectical argument ‘searches for a “counter 
syllogism” of which the conclusion is contradictory ... to the [endoxic] thesis itself’ (p. 
390).15 The primary function of dialectic is that of ‘dissipating the false persuasions of 
knowledge’ based on fallacious first principles or taken-for-granted, commonsense 
beliefs and assumptions (p. 391). The subject matter may be ‘ethical’, ‘physical’, or 
‘logical’ (Grote, 1872, p. 394).16  
Abstraction again becomes significant when we encounter the human 
“essence” in Marx. That is because Marx does not regard it as some vague, 
immutable, and constant ‘abstraction inherent in each individual’ (Marx 1845/1975, p. 
423). The reality of the human ‘essence’ is, rather, a dynamic set of relationships, ‘the 
ensemble of social relations’ in which each person is embedded (Marx, 1845/1975, p. 
423). Aristotle defines “essences” under ten categories. 17 The most noteworthy aspect 
of the categories is, though, how Aristotle develops them. He considers them ‘in their 
relation to Propositions; and his ten classes discriminate the relation which they bear 
to each other as parts or constituent elements of a proposition’ (Grote, 1872, p. 94). 
Even more significantly for socially grounded linguistics, the categories are drawn 
from ‘common speech; and from the dialectic … which debated about matters of 
common life and talk, about received and current opinions’ (pp. 94-95). Aristotle’s 
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Categories are derived from language-in-use within specific social contexts. They are 
sociolinguistically derived. 
 “Essences” may be either abstract or concrete, but in Aristotle, ‘Abstract alone 
can be predicated of abstract; concrete alone can be predicated of concrete. If we 
describe the relation between the abstract and the concrete, we must say, The Abstract 
is in the Concrete—the concrete contains or embodies the Abstract’ (Grote, 1872, p. 
91). But Marx, like Hegel before him, is concerned with showing the historical 
relationship between abstract and concrete aspects of human experience through the  
deployment of dialectical argument (Hook, 1928, pp. 120-123).18 The aim of dialectic 
is not to discover truth, but rather to ‘convict an opponent of inconsistency’ and to 
propose counter assertions (p. 385). The method is designed to investigate the 
common meanings – the accepted assumptions, definitions, and understandings – of a 
given subject by way of investigating the received, authoritative statements about it. It 
proceeds by laying out the orthodoxies of, for instance, a particular science, into its 
accepted propositions; differentiating between the various uses and meanings of these; 
and showing the relationships of these parts to the whole subject matter.  
The dialectical method that Marx deploys should be confused with the 
reductio ad absurdum carried on by the late scholasticism of the counter-reformation 
(cf. McKeon, 1928; Saul, 1992, 1997). Rather, it is as an expression of what we know 
as ‘scientific method’ (Randall, 1940). The ‘free thinkers’ among the scholastics, 
especially those in the school of Padua, developed through dialectic method, a method  
based on the ‘careful analysis of experience’ that ‘left their hands with a refinement 
and precision … which the seventeenth century scientists who used it did not surpass 
in all their careful investigation of method’ (Randall, 1940, p. 178). In this sense, 
“scientific method” and “critical method” are identical. Both are founded, 
dialectically, on a healthy skepticism towards common sense, dogma, and taken-for-
grantedness. At their very foundation they are relational and dynamic, social and 
empirical linguistic methods. Critical praxis stands opposed to what is now often 
called “ideology”, but which has always been the dominating myths propagated by 
vested interests (Adorno, 1973, p. 56; Horkheimer & Adorno 1947/1998, p. 20). This 
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brings us to a central and overt object of Marx’s critical engagement with language: 
ideology. 
Ideology: Language, social consciousness, and language critique  
The term “ideology” has for some time been understood as “false 
consciousness”, “ruling class ideals”, “belief systems”, “mistaken common sense”, 
“religious dogma”, or something similar (see e.g. Bergmann, 1951; Burks, 1949;  
Huxley, 1950, p. 10; Kennedy, 1979, p. 353, Lipset, 1966; Roucek, 1944, p. 479; 
Sartori, 1969). However, ideology was conceived of in the first instance as an 
intellectual discipline to fill the perceived void left by the Church’s moral authority 
and the scholastic system’s associated monopoly on knowledge in post-Thermidorian 
France (Kennedy, 1979; Roucek, 1994). As such, it dominated the last few years of 
eighteenth century France, and continued as a dominant influence for the first half of 
the nineteenth century throughout Western Europe, including Italy and Spain, even 
having considerable influence in the United States (Kennedy, 1979, pp. 362-364; 
Roucek, 1944, p. 482).19 As a terminology and an intellectual project, “Ideology” was 
initially conceived of by Destutt de Tracy (1754-1836) with the explicit purpose of 
dominating the whole human intellectual environment, including the fields of 
morality, political economy, physics, calculus, and, ultimately, politics proper 
(Kennedy, 1979, pp. 356-358). Tracy intended that ideology should replace theology 
as the ‘queen’ of human intellectual endeavour (Kennedy, 1979, p. 356). Its 
formulation was an attempt to stabilise post-revolutionary France in the very image of 
the Enlightenment:  
At stake was a whole political and social philosophy, a conservative post-
Thermidorean liberalism of a part of the propertied class, an Ideology which was 
strongly materialist in its conception of the relationship between the physical and the 
moral. (p. 356).  
Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, Ideology was a much-
contested movement, especially in the social and political sciences of France and 
Germany. ‘Ideology’ was meant literally as the ‘science of ideas’ (Kennedy, 1979, p. 
355). It was first announced as such by Tracy in 1796, with a full social, political, 
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educational, and economic agenda later being published by him in a four-volume 
work in 1805 (Kennedy, 1979; Roucek, 1944, p. 482). Late eighteenth century 
scholars associated with the movement searched to unite political economy, moral 
philosophy, and the liberal arts to develop ‘a sound “theory of the moral and political 
sciences” which embraced grammar, logic, education, morality, and “finally the 
greatest of arts, for whose success all the others must cooperate, that of regulating 
society”’ (Kennedy, 1979, p. 355; cf. also Neill, 1949). And that was Ideology, a 
liberal science of human thought with the ultimate purpose of regulating social 
morality. Its central focus was language and its relationship to thought (Kennedy, 
1979, pp. 364-366).  
In the genesis of Marx’s method, his critique of The German Ideology 
(1846/1972) is the point at which his relational social logic, his materialist perspective 
on dynamic abstraction, and his conception of socio-historical transitivity as 
productive human activity are first fully expressed. The German Ideology marks a 
watershed in Marx’s intellectual project. It synthesises and summarise his political, 
economic, historical, social, and philosphical positions; it contains a statement of the 
first principles of Marx’s political economy; and it is the beginnings of the “mature” 
Marx. Not surprisingly, it is here that we find Marx formulating his most explicit and 
sustained treatment of language and consciousness as material processes of 
production, as aspects of the social production process which are inherently bound up 
in the totality and materiality of human experience. 
Marx’s much referred to comments about language in The German Ideology 
(1846/1972) are best seen as a critical response to the idealist, alienated conceptions 
of language and consciousness widely propagated by the formal ‘ideologists’, or, in 
the Napoleonic perjorative, ‘ideologues’, of the day, particularly those associated with 
Tracy. The French ideologists had their German counterparts in the “Young 
Hegelians”, led in the early nineteenth century by Bruno Bauer (1809-1882) and Max 
Stirner (1806-1856). It is the Germans who are the main targets of Marx’s critique. In 
Germany, the “Young Hegelians” developed their own “science of ideas” based on 
Hegel’s philosophy and his intensely conservative conceptions of the state. Ideology, 
both in its French and German formulations, was essentially a legitimising discipline 
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comprised of ‘Natural Order’ apologists for the French and Prussian aristocracies of 
the day (Kennedy, 1979; Marx, 1846/1972; Neill, 1949).  
Marx and formal ideology were contemporaries.20 He saw ideology as a 
contrivance by vested interests to fill the moral void left by the diminshed influence of 
the Church and “Divine Right” monarchies, and a fortiori their socially sanctioned 
authority. The intentions of ideology’s earliest proponents, ‘a group of propertied 
intellectuals in power after Thermidor’, was to ‘transform and stabilize post-
revolutionary France’ by supplanting the eroded authority of the Church and the 
Monarchy with the study of ideology (Kennedy, 1979, p. 358). The express focus of 
ideology was language and its relationship to thought: ‘[w]e can never pay too much 
attention to the illusions which certain words produce. Nothing proves better how 
vague and confused their meaning is’ (Tracy, 1805, in Kennedy, 1979). For the most 
enthusiastic of the French School, ‘Ideology’ was to be ‘the torchlight of grammar’ 
(Lemare, 1812, in Kennedy, 1979, p. 363). Marx’s perjorative construal of ideology, 
which includes references to the French and German schools in The German Ideology 
(1846/1972), Grundrisse (1857/1973), and Capital (1976, 1978, 1981), comes ‘not 
from Hegel … but only from the cumulative usages current in the 1830s and 1840s 
and specifically from Destutt De Tracy’ (Kennedy, 1979, p. 366). The German 
Ideology firstly critiques ideological conceptions of the relationship between 
language, consciousness, social life, and “civil society”.  
The ideologists had emphasised the unity of language and thought, language 
being for them a system of arbitrary signs, the externalised artefacts of thought 
‘abstracted from time and men’ (Frank, 1844, in Kennedy, 1979, p. 364). For Tracy, 
ideas are ‘the only things that exist for us, the only means we have to know things’ 
(Kennedy, 1979, p. 364).21 Hegel is identical to the French ideologists in his 
conception of language and thought:  
The strictly raw material of language itself depends more upon an inward symbolism 
than a symbolism referring to external objects; it depends, i.e. on anthropological 
articulation, as it were the posture in the corporeal act of oral utterance. For each 
vowel and each consonant accordingly, as well as for their more abstract elements … 
and for their combinations, people have tried to find the appropriate signification. 
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But these dull subconscious beginnings are deprived of their original importance and 
prominence by new influences, it may be by external agencies or by the needs of 
civilization. Having been originally sensuous intuitions, they are reduced to signs, 
and thus have only traces left of their original meaning, if it be not altogether 
extinguished. As to the formal element, again, it is the work of analytic intellect 
[Verstand] which informs language with its categories: it is this logical instinct which 
gives rise to grammar. (Hegel, 1830/1998, p. 306) 
Marx held an almost opposite perspective on the relationship between language and 
thought:  
The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly 
interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourses of men, the 
language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at 
this stage as the direct efflux of their material behaviour. The same applies to mental 
production as expressed in the language of politics, laws, morality, religion, 
metaphysics etc. of a people. Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc 
— real active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their 
productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest 
form. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the 
existence of men is their actual life-process. If in all ideology men and their 
circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises 
just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina 
does from their physical life-process (Marx 1846/1972: 118). 
For Hegel, language functions to externalise the internal and intuitive state of isolated 
individuals. It is ‘the imagination which creates signs’, and these signs are language 
(Hegel, 1833/1998,  p. 303). In Hegel’s ideology, meaning made in language moves 
from abstract intuition and imagination to symbolise and particularise already 
universalised meanings (i.e. a system of already-thought-of abstractions), ‘reason’ 
being the universalizing force, mechanism, or system into which the categorical 
effects of language “fit” (p. 305). Language, as a system of signs, is ‘a product of 
intelligence’, and ‘gives to sensations, intuitions, conceptions, a second and higher 
existence than they naturally possess - invests them with the right of existence in the 
ideational realm’ (Hegel, 1833/1998, pp. 303-305; cf. also Hegel, 1807/1966, ***). 
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Hegel’s view is that the written word drives language forward to ‘perfection’ 
(1833/1998, p. 307). He derides the ‘hieroglyphic mode of writing’ for keeping the 
‘Chinese vocal language from reaching that objective precision which is gained in 
articulation by alphabetic writing’ (p. 307). Alphabetic writing ‘is on all accounts the 
more intelligent: in it the word – the mode, peculiar to the intellect, of uttering its 
ideas most worthily – is brought to consciousness and made an object of reflection’ (p. 
307). But for Marx, language is firstly a social and material phenomenon, not the 
reified object of abstract speculation. It is, rather, a dynamic social product that 
emerges from the material relationships between people and their social and material 
environments: ‘language, like consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity, 
of intercourse with other men’ (1845/1972, p. 122). For Marx, meaning travels in 
entirely the opposite direction from Hegel.   
Similarities can be seen between the German ideologists and the hard-line 
social-constructivist school that rose to prominence in the last quarter of the twentieth 
century in western social theory: 
Since the Young Hegelians consider conceptions, thoughts, ideas, in fact all the 
products of consciousness, to which they attribute an independent existence, as the 
real chains of men … it is evident that the Young Hegelians have to fight only 
against these illusions of consciousness. Since, according to their fantasy,  the 
relationships of men, all their doings, their chains and their limitations are products 
of consciousness, the Young Hegelians logically put to men the moral postulate of 
exchanging their present consciousness for human, critical, or egoistic consciousnes, 
and thus removing their limitations. This demand to change consciousness amounts 
to demands to interpret reality in another way, i.e. to recognise it by means of another 
interpretation. (1846/1972, p. 113) 
Like the latter-day constructivists, the Young Hegelians find themselves at war with 
‘“phrases”. They forget, however, that to these phrases they themselves are only 
opposing other phrases, and that they are in no way combating the real existing world 
when they are merely combating the phrases of this world’ (p. 113). Marx is clear that 
‘the language of real life’ - a many-sided metaphor for social praxis - is materially 
implicated in a reciprocally causal relationship with the whole of social life, including 
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language in the abstract, its categories, and the social relations in which these are 
produced by people.  
These are the foundations, history, and context of Marx’s critical approach. It 
is a critical praxis that views productive processes, not as merely or exclusively 
‘economic’ activities, but more precisely, as the network of social activities by which 
societies reproduce themselves at every level: materially, socially, relationally, 
consciously, economically, and linguistically (Graham, 2000, p. 137). The dialectic is 
Marx’s method of analysis. A materialist approach to the problem of abstraction is his 
theoretical underpinning. Language, consciousness, and praxis are considered to be in 
an inseparable relationship of ‘causal reciprocity’ (Hook, 1928a, p. 124). Combined, 
the theoretical and methodological tools outlined here provide a critical, linguistic, 
propositional method of analysis, the main purpose of which is to challenge the taken-
for-grantedness of common sense ideas about human life, precisely by beginning with 
human life rather than deducing it a posteriori from eternal ideas. Dialectical 
materialism ‘is what Aristotle becomes when modified by Hegel and Darwin. It is an 
emergent naturalism with a strong anti-religious flavor struggling with the problem of 
“time”’ (Hook, 1928a, p. 122).  
Language critique is thus central to Marx’s approach; an historical, materialist, 
critical understanding of language is the very foundation of his method. But language 
is not a separate or independent “thing” for Marx, not the object of decontextualised 
contemplation. The transitivity of the clause and the transitivity of human social life 
are predicated of one and the same subject: human social activity, ‘the language of 
real life’. Critical language analysis is central to Marx’s method precisely because 
language is the only way we have of grasping the diachronics of changing social 
circumstances – not language as an abstract system of signs, but as a mutually 
determining product and substance of changing material circumstances and practices; 
not as the abstract representative of externalised ideas, but as both product, producer, 
and reproducer of social consciousness, which in turn is in a reciprocally causal 
relationship with the whole of the human experience. In these very important respects, 
Marx’s method and the methods of CDA are identical. 
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Language Critique in the Development of Marx’s Method 
We now discuss a number of Marx’s texts - two economic texts (Economic 
and Philosophic Manuscripts, 1844/1975, and Capital [vol 1], 1867/1976), two 
political texts (Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State, 1843/1975; Critique of the 
Gotha Programme, 1875/1972), and an historical analysis (Eighteenth Brumaire of 
Louis Bonaparte, 1851-2/1972). The aim here is twofold. First, to discuss the 
development of Marx’s critical method in terms of how language critique figures 
within it, especially with reference to the economic texts. Second, to illustrate how 
Marx deploys critical linguistic analysis in different ways in different types of text – 
economic, political, and historical. 
Throughout the early Marx, through to the Grundrisse, we can clearly identify 
elements of a classical Aristotlean method, especially in the predominance of specific 
analytical and taxonomic terminologies: “subjects and predicates”; “Ens”, “genus”, 
and “species”; “differentia and semblances”; “accidents and errors in language”, and 
so on.22 A longitudinal shift in Marx’s method can be seen in both his political and 
economic texts. In the earlier economic texts, up to and including the Grundrisse 
(1857-8), Marx deploys the method we have outlined above: a close reading and 
dialectical critique of the texts of the classical political economists. In his mature 
work, Capital, his own alternative to the theory of the political economists is 
presented. This does not mean that texts of the political economists do not figure in 
Capital – there are many quotations, especially in the footnotes – but they have a 
different role, and there is less explicit critique of the language of the texts. At this 
point, it he uses the words of classical political economy, as well as parliamentary 
reports and submissions, as either ‘documentary proof’ of his assertions, or as ‘a 
running commentary to the text, a commentary borrowed from the history of 
economic science’ (Engels, 1883, in Marx, 1976, p. 108).23 We begin our exposition 
with a political text, Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State (1843/1975).  
Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State 
Marx’s much-refined Aristotlean method, one that is immediately recognisable 
as such, is especially evident in Marx’s early works. Following is a passage from 
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Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State in which Marx deploys a classic dialectical 
method, directly and critically engaging one of Hegel’s texts (Hegel’s is the first 
paragraph, italics are in the original):  
[§ 267] ‘This necessity in ideality is the inner self-development of the Idea. As the 
substance of the individual subject, it is the political sentiment [patriotism]; in 
distinction therefrom, as the substance of the objective world, it is the organism of 
the state, i.e. it is the strictly political state and its constitution.’  
The subject here is ‘necessity in ideality’, the ‘inner self of the Idea’, the predicate – 
political sentiment and the political constitution. In plain words this means: political 
sentiment is the subjective substance of the state, the political constitution its 
objective substance. The logical development from the family and civil society to the 
state is, therefore, mere appearance as we are not shown how family and civil 
sentiment, and family and social institutions, as such are related  to political 
sentiment and political institutions. […] 
The crux of the matter is that Hegel everywhere makes the Idea into the subject, 
while the genuine, real subject, such as ‘political sentiment’, is turned into the 
predicate. The development, however, always takes place on the side of the 
predicate. (Marx, 1843/1975, p. 65, italics in original)   
This critique appears to be almost entirely logico-grammatical in its approach. Marx 
critiques Hegel for what seems like a grammatical error. More precisely, though, it is a 
critique of Hegel’s idealistic inversion of reality: “the Idea” is forced erroneously into 
the position of ‘subject’, which is clearly understood here by Marx as an active, 
transitive entity, and an entity definable as such by its logical position and its 
‘development’ in the text. Hegel is mistakenly asserting agency for “the Idea” rather 
than for a ‘genuine, real subject’, ‘political sentiment’, for instance. It is worth noting 
here that Marx is careful to firstly engage Hegel within the realm of abstraction; he 
avoids asserting in the first instance that ‘the political constitution’ ought to be 
predicated of family, civil sentiment, social institutions, and the relations between 
these, thus avoiding predicating abstract qualities of concrete relations in a single step, 
according to the traditions of dialectical critique (Grote, 1872, p. 91).24 He chooses 
instead to take Hegel on his own terms, that is, entirely in the realm of abstraction. 
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Even here, he points out that Hegel is mistaken: “political sentiment” ought to be 
subject and “the state” its predicate – abstract object predicated of abstract subject; the 
“state” as manifest “political sentiment”. 
This brief fragment of critical analysis achieves a threefold effect. First, Marx 
identifies the agency that Hegel typically and erroneously attributes to “the Idea”. 
Second, he proposes the correct logical abstract relations of Hegel’s proposition. 
Third, Marx formulates the concrete, materialist alternative: that the real relations, 
which Hegel reduces to ‘mere appearance’, an illusory expression of ‘the Idea’ at 
work, are to be found in the relationships between ‘family and civil sentiment’ and 
‘family and social institutions’ to ‘political sentiment and political institutions’. This 
shows quite clearly that Marx is not merely inverting Hegel. He does that in the first 
move by rearranging subject and predicate, by firstly rearranging the relations in 
Hegel’s proposition, and then by framing the materialist form of the problem. Rather 
than attempting to reveal relations between abstract subjects and predicates in a single 
step, Marx presents an emergent, materialist formulation of the problem. He presents 
“family”, the smallest social institution of society, in its relation to ‘civil sentiment’ 
on the one hand, and to ‘social institutions’ on the other, as the correct formulation of 
the problem.25 We see, then, that Marx is indeed concerned with investigating ‘both 
consciousness and life and the “relation” between them’ (Warminski, 1995, p. 120).  
Warminski’s scare quotes around relation denote the fact that Marx does not see 
consciousness and life as separate “things”, even though consciousness in particular is 
a clearly definable aspect of human life in general.26 For Marx, life, language, social 
activity, and consciousness are essential and inseparably related aspects of human 
phenomena in terms of materiality and causality. By noting this, we are concerned 
again with stressing Marx’s materialist perspective on meaning-making and its 
inseparability from human experience in all its aspects. Designating concrete relations 
in terms of “subjects” and “predicates” is for Marx, quite clearly, the act of asserting 
historically dynamic, causal, reciprocal, co-extensive relations amongst elements in 
language, and consequently amongst the elements of human life itself.  
Aristotle directs the dialectician to investigate propositions in a particular way: 
they are to be put in the most general terms possible and stated as Universal if they are 
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generally believed to be true (Grote, 1872, p. 401). They are then to be reduced as far 
as possible into their particulars. But this is not to be done in a single step, ‘not at 
once as separate individuals, but as comprised in subordinate genera and species; 
descending from highest to least divisible’ (Grote, 1872, p. 413).27 Both Hegel and 
Marx clearly deploy such an approach in their critical analyses. Here, Marx is again 
testing Hegel’s assertions about the constitution of the State (Hegel’s words are in the 
quotation marks):  
(1) ‘This organism is the differentiation of the Idea into various elements and their 
objective reality.’ It is not argued that the organism of the state is its differentiation 
into various elements and their objective reality. The real point here is that the 
organism of the state is its differentiation into various elements and their reality is 
organic. The real differences or the various aspects of the political constitution are 
the presupposition of the subject. The predicate is their definition as organic. Instead, 
the Idea is made into the subject, the distinct members and their reality are 
understood as its development, its result, whereas the reverse holds good, viz. that the 
Idea must be developed from the real differences. The organic is precisely the Idea of 
the differences and their ideal determination. 
 (2) Hegel, however, talks here of the Idea as of a subject that becomes differentiated 
into its members. Apart from the reversal of subject and predicate, the appearance is 
created that there is an idea over and above the organism. The starting point is the 
abstract Idea which then develops into the political constitution of the state. We are 
not concerned with a political Idea but with the abstract Idea in a political form. The 
mere fact I say “this organism (i.e. the state, the political constitution) is the 
differentiation of the Idea into various elements etc.” does not mean that I know 
anything about the specific idea of the political constitution; the same statement can 
be made about the organism of an animal as about the organism of the state. How are 
we to distinguish between animal and political organisms? Our general definitions 
do not advance our understanding. An explanation, however, which fails to supply 
the differentia is no explanation at all (Marx, 1843/1975, p. 67) 
Here is another formal term of Aristotlean dialectic by which propositions are 
separated into to their constituent parts: differentia (Grote, 1872, p. 417). But this 
should be understood as dynamic differentiation, the real and transitive splitting of a 
whole into its constituent parts over time, and conversely, the emergent formation of 
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constituents into “wholes”, in language as in life. Closely related to this is the concept 
of organic relations between constituent elements, ‘predicates’, of the ‘subject’.28 In 
short, these are the Participant-elements of the state which stand in logically necessary 
and constitutional relationships with each other and with the state; the state emerges 
from the relations between these human elements. Thus, according to the argument 
Marx is putting forward against Hegel, any assertions about the nature of the state 
should be deduced from the differences between its constituent parts, and, as a 
corollary of this, from the nature of the essential relationships between these elements. 
The organic is the thus the ideal expression of the sum total of all relations within the 
state between the different constituents of the state. Hegel does not go far enough. He 
stops at the most general of terms, failing even to differentiate between the organic 
nature (constituents) of, for instance, animals, and the organic nature of the state. 
Hegel is admonished for his of misuse of abstraction, as well as for his failure to show 
the real constituent parts of these. 
By absolutising the Idea, Hegel objectifies human consciousness, he attributes 
abstract ideas with historical agency, a phenomenon most clearly expressed in the 
dogmas of religion (1844/1975, pp. 382-385). Hegel’s idealism, like contemporary 
neoliberal economics, reduces real human history, real human activity, to a purely 
theoretical abstraction, a universalised Idea which can have no meaningful relation  to 
particular people because it is a closed system of abstractions which can only refer to 
its own insubstantial and circular elements. In such a system  
Real man and real nature become mere predicates, symbols of this hidden, unreal 
man and this unreal nature. Subject and predicate therefore stand in a relation of 
absolute inversion to one another; a mystical subject-object or subjectivity 
encroaching upon the object, the absolute subject as a process, as a subject which 
alienates itself and returns to itself from alienation, while at the same time re-
absorbing this alienation, and the subject as this process; pure, ceaseless revolving 
within itself. (p. 396) 
Here, we see further allusions to language in what seems like quite a metaphorical 
form: humanity and nature become ‘predicates’ of the ‘subject’, which is ‘God, 
absolute spirit, the self-knowing and self-manifesting idea’ (p. 396). Marx then 
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reconstrues ‘subject’ to expose the tension between passive and active elements in the 
relationships implicit in Hegel. Hegel’s subject [self-realising self-consciousness] 
stands in a conflated relationship with its object [humanity in the abstract, i.e. as 
already-thought-of, theoretical humans]. In asserting a relationship between the 
Universal Idea and the abstract Idea of thinkers, Hegel in fact separates real thought 
from real thinkers, leaving a pure abstraction, the  Idea, as the motivating force of 
history. Hegel’s conflated ‘subject-object’ is thus devoid of meaningful content: 
because it is  
nothing more than the abstract, empty form of that real living act, its content can only 
be a formal [i.e. abstract] content, created by abstraction from all content. 
Consequently there are general, abstract forms of abstraction which fit every content 
and are therefore indifferent to all content; forms of thought and logical categories 
torn away from real mind and real nature.  (pp. 396-397) 
His subject, the Absolute Idea, with its historical universe of dependent predicates – 
namely abstract humanity and abstract nature – is thus separated from its source, 
humans actively thinking (and, presumably, speaking, acting, and so on). Hegel’s 
subject therefore has no meaningful content because it can only refer to a constituency 
of abstract aspects of itself, all of which stand in a pre-defined relationship with the 
abstract subject, the Idea. Here again we find oblique allusions to language: 
abstractions that are indifferent to all content, logical categories and forms of thought 
torn from their realities. Marx is both critiquing Hegel’s theoretical discourse, and 
indicating an alternative way of constituting a theoretical discourse, i.e. through 
identifying the relationships, the interconnected and mutually defining activities, of 
real life. 
In engaging Hegel’s assertions about the State, Marx develops in incipient 
form the foundational elements of his critical method. And, in identifying the 
historical significance of Hegel’s dynamic understanding of abstraction, he formulates 
the rationale for his materialist method: 29 
Hegel’s positive achievement in his speculative logic is to present determinate 
concepts, the universal fixed thought-forms in their independence of nature and mind, 
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as a necessary result of the universal estrangement of human existence, and thus also 
of human thought, and to comprehend them as moments of abstraction (p. 397). […] 
But nature too, taken abstractly, for itself, and fixed in its separation from man, is 
nothing for man. It goes without saying that the abstract thinker who decides on 
intuition, intuits nature abstractly.30 Just as nature lay enclosed in the thinker in a 
shape which even to him was shrouded and mysterious, as an absolute idea, a thing 
of thought, so what he allowed to come forth from himself was simply this abstract 
nature, nature as a thing of thought … . Or, to put it in human terms, the abstract 
thinker discovers from intuiting nature that the entities he imagined he was creating 
out of nothing, out of pure abstraction, in a divine dialectic, as the pure products of 
the labour of thought living and moving within itself and never looking out into 
reality, are nothing more than abstractions from natural forms. (pp. 398-399) 
By investigating the way in which Marx engages Hegel’s idealism regarding the State, 
we can see that many of the foundational concepts that Marx deploys in his critique of 
political economy later on are developed using the elements of language critique that 
we have outlined above (abstraction, dialectic, and ideology): alienation; conceptual 
fetishism; objectification and reification; the labour process; labour as an all-
embracing conception of productive human activity; and the primacy of material 
reality, including social reality, in determining consciousness — all of these aspects 
can be identified in incipient form in Marx’s critical engagement with Hegel’s idealist 
discourse on the politics of the State.  
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts 
We now move to the First Manuscript of the Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts (1844/1975). This marks an important turning point in Marx’s work, and 
not merely in terms of his new focus upon political economy. He brings the 
conceptual elements incipient in the critique of Hegel (objectification, alienation, 
conceptual fetishism, the labour process) to bear upon the problems of political 
economy. Marx gives his own account of what he is doing in much of the 
Manuscripts, especially in the first part. We can see that he proceeds from the 
“endoxa”, the received wisdom, of classical political economy, explicitly confining 
his empirical investigation ‘to the propositions of political economy’ in order to 
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challenge its foundational assertions and formulate a contradictory thesis, or, in the 
formal terminology of dialectic, “counter syllogisms”, of his own (Marx, 1844/1975, 
p. 315). We receive further explicit evidence that Marx is engaged in language 
critique from the Preface of the Manuscripts:  
It is hardly necessary to assure the reader who is familiar with political economy that 
I arrived at my conclusions through an entirely empirical analysis based on an 
exhaustive critical study of political economy. (***) 
By ‘political economy’, Marx means the texts of the political economists. There is an 
oscillation of voices in the Manuscripts which is sometimes difficult to keep track of 
(Carver 1998): there are many quotations from the political economists, and there is 
Marx’s own voice, which is sometimes echoing the political economists, sometimes 
critiquing them. What sort of critique is this? We argue that it is a critical analysis of 
what would nowadays be called the discourse of the political economists, which 
sometimes refers to their language, sometimes to their ‘propositions’, ‘arguments’, 
‘presuppositions’. At all levels of analysis, though, Marx keeps the socially positioned 
and conditioned representations of capitalism made by political economy in view. 
The Manuscripts begins with a section on ‘The Wages of Labour’ which at 
first is purely in Marx’s own voice and which hardly refers to the political economists, 
other than paraphrasing Smith (1776/1997, 1776/1998) briefly. This introductory 
section is a summary of the conclusions he draws about wage labour in Excerpts from 
James Mill’s "Elements of Political Economy” (1844), the original version of which 
contains a total of 97 quotations from Mill.31 Then Marx writes: ‘Let us put ourselves 
now wholly at the standpoint of the political economist, and follow him in comparing 
the theoretical and practical claims of the worker’. Much of the pages which follow 
consists of Marx’s own representations of “what the political economist tells us”, or 
extracts from the political economists, sometimes with minimal connecting linkages 
from Marx. For the most part, according to dialectical method, we are hearing the 
political economists ‘in their own words’. But there are also some critical 
recontextualisations from Marx. For example, he writes at one point: ‘Let us now rise 
above the level of political economy and try to answer two questions …’ (***).  
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The section numbered VII, 1-3 consists of a summary of claims of ‘the 
political economist’ about labour, set out in a pattern of concessional + main clauses 
which highlight contradictions in the political economists’ discourse:  
Whilst according to the political economists it is solely through labour that man 
enhances the value of the products of nature … according to this same political 
economy the landowner and the capitalist … are everywhere superior to the worker 
and lay down the law to him. (***) 
Here, we see Marx highlighting conflicting views of the relationships that define 
Capital as a form of social organisation. Marx concludes this set of contradictory 
claims as follows: ‘But that labour itself, not merely in present conditions … is 
harmful and pernicious follows from the political economist’s line of argument, 
without his being aware of it’ (***).Marx is drawing a conclusion from the arguments 
and the words of the political economists which is implicit in them, a conclusion 
which the political economists were not aware of, and which ‘rises above the level of 
political economy’ (‘transcends’ it in Hegelian terms). It is a conclusion which is 
highly contradictory to the arguments of Smith, Mill, Ricardo, etc, . 
Marx uses the same technique in subsection (4) of the section headed ‘The 
Profit of Capital’. He critiques the political economists by showing the contradictions 
in their own words with respect to their claim that  
the sole defence against the capitalists [and against monopoly] is competition, which 
according to the evidence of political economy acts beneficently by both raising 
wages and lowering the prices of commodities to the advantage of the consuming 
public’ (***) .  
This is dialectical argument, on the basis of quotations from the political economists, 
aimed at producing a counter-syllogism to that of the political economists, namely that 
competition leads to its opposite, monopoly; that ‘competition among capitalists 
increases the accumulation of capital … the concentration of capital in the hands of 
the few’; and that ‘if labour is a commodity, it is a commodity with the most 
unfortunate characteristics’ because it is doomed to reduce its own worth along with 
those of other commodities as productivity increases. Marx notes later that although 
‘the doctrine of competition’ in political economy is ‘opposed’ to ‘the doctrine of 
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monopoly’, competition is an ‘accidental, deliberate, violent consequence’ of 
monopoly, and not its ‘necessary, inevitable, and natural’ consequence. 32 Today’s 
monopolistic global megaliths, institutional and corporate, which preside over the 
most systematic, overt, and pronounced social inequalities in history, continue to 
propound the doctrine of monopoly in precisely the manner Marx is criticising here. 
Marx’s critique of classical political economy discourse also holds true for its 
contemporary counterpart. Marx’s earliest critique remains relevant.  
The section headed ‘Rent of Land’ includes a discussion of feudal landed 
property (XVII-XVIII). Here, Marx’s relational logic is foregrounded. The ‘essence’ 
of feudal landed property is the ‘domination of the land as an alien power over men. 
The serf is the adjunct of the land. Likewise, the lord of an entailed estate, the first-
born son, belongs to the land’ (***). In terms of the Aristotelian method of dialectic 
discussed earlier, the serf and the lord are ‘predicates’ of the essence, its co-defining 
‘relata’ and ‘correlata’,  without which feudal relations could not exist. But the 
illusory ‘appearance’ expressed in these relations is ‘a more intimate connection 
between the proprietor and the land’, and between the lord and the serf. It does not 
‘appear directly as the rule of mere capital’ (***). The ‘appearance’ of this form of 
social organisation is ‘expressed’ in the language, ‘nulle terre sans mâitre’ (***).33 
The foundation of the Lord-Serf relationship is the blending of land and master, the 
personification of feudal land as the Lord who carries the name of the land (***), and 
as such belongs to it. As objects of the land, Lord and Serf are feudalism’s socio-
historical enactment. However, for capital, ‘it is necessary that this appearance be 
abolished – that landed property ... be dragged completely into the movement of 
private property and that it become a commodity; that the rule of the proprietor appear 
as the undisguised rule of private property’ (***). 
‘Appearance’ here is shifting ‘forms’ which the ‘essence’ of feudal 
organisation (the domination of the land as an alien power over people) takes, at first 
‘disguised’ then ‘undisguised’. It is also how the feudal property relationship 
‘appears’ to the people whose relationships define it as such, as their consciousness of 
these historical relationships. The dynamic process of landed property in the 
movement from feudalism to capitalism – from land as “common weal” to land as 
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private property, the foundation of Capital – leads to ‘the abolition of the distinction 
between capitalist and landowner’, the relationship between its ‘essence’ and its 
‘forms’ of ‘appearance’, how they ‘appear’ to people, and the language in which these 
‘appearances’ is ‘expressed’.  Marx’s account grasps the  interconnection between 
land and capital as forms of property relations in their historical movement, rather 
than just registering ‘appearances’ (temporary forms, forms given to consciousness in 
the social practice of historically entrenched relations, including the language in which 
these are expressed and defined). He shows, in reality, that the qualitative 
transformation from feudalism to capitalism is a relational and institutional 
transformation which in effect removes the illusion of personal domination to reveal 
the rule of ‘thing over person’ which lies latent in the appearance of feudalism:  
the rule of person over person now becomes the universal rule of the thing over the 
person, the product of the producer. Just as the equivalent, value, contained the 
determination of the alienation of private property, so now we see that money is the 
sensuous, corporeal existence of that alienation. (p. 270) 
The final section of the First Manuscript is headed ‘Estranged Labour’. It is a 
critique of commodification and alienation. Marx begins:   
We have started out from the propositions of political economy. We have accepted 
its language and its laws. We presupposed private property; the separation of labour, 
capital and land, and likewise of wages, profit and capital; the division of labour; 
competition; the concept of exchange value, etc. From political economy itself, using 
its own words, we have shown that the worker sinks to the level of a commodity, and 
moreover the most wretched commodity of all; that the misery of the worker is in 
inverse proportion to the power and volume of his production; that the necessary 
consequence of competition is the accumulation of capital in a few hands and hence 
the restoration of monopoly in a more terrible form; and that finally the distinction 
between capitalist and landlord, between agriculturalist worker and industrial worker, 
disappears and the whole of society must split into the two classes of property 
owners and propertyless workers. (p. 322) 34 
This passage from the Manuscripts again highlights the dialectical and relational 
foundations of Marx’s method of language critique. Starting with the propositions, 
language and laws of political economy, which construe the move to a capitalist 
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economy as inherently triumphalist (a familiar theme in today’s global order), Marx 
presents an alternative view of the historical move from feudal relations to capitalist 
ones, and the critical implications thereof. He also presents three foundational and 
essential aspect of his later critical formulation in Capital: class antagonism based on 
ownership rights; the commodification of productive human activity; and, as a 
corollary to these, the alienation of labour itself, its belonging to someone, or more 
importantly some thing, else.  
Listed later in the section: ‘the more the worker produces, the less he has to 
consume; the more values he creates, the more valueless, unworthy, he becomes’, etc. 
These are the realities – the laws of political economy are mere euphemistic 
explanations, mistakes of comprehension:   
It [political economy] does not Comprehend these laws -- i.e., it does not show how 
they arise from the nature of private property. …. Precisely because political 
economy fails to grasp the interconnections within the movement, it was possible to 
oppose, for example, the doctrine of competition to the doctrine of monopoly, the 
doctrine of craft freedom to the doctrine of the guild, and the doctrine of the division 
of landed property to the doctrine of the great estate; for competition, craft freedom, 
and division of landed property were developed and conceived only as accidental, 
deliberate, violent consequences of monopoly, of the guilds, and of feudal property, 
and not as their necessary, inevitable, and natural consequences. (***)   
And later in the section: ‘Political economy conceals the estrangement in the nature of 
labor by ignoring the direct relationship between the worker (labor) and production.’ 
Marx’s repeated criticism of political economy here is that it ‘fails to grasp the 
interconnections within the movement’ – it fails to give a dynamic account of 
relationships that give rise to its analytical abstractions, which are merely 
‘appearances’ and ‘expressions’ of deeper relationships. It is a failure in the discourse 
of political economy – a problem of socially positioned representation, a problem of 
its misappropriation and recontextualisation of the world in political economic 
discourse. Therefore,  
We now have to grasp the essential connection between private property, greed, the 
separation of labor, capital and landed property, exchange and competition, value and 
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the devaluation [Entwertung] of man, monopoly, and competition, etc. -- the 
connection between this entire system of estrangement [Entfremdung] and the money 
system.  
Marx goes on to give an extended account of how the worker is alienated in capitalist 
production – alienated from the product of labour, from him/herself (‘self-
estrangement’), from common humanity (‘species-being’), and from other workers by 
the intermediation of money and property relations. The alienated relationship of 
workers to what they produce, their consciousness of themselves and each other, the 
relationship between work and capitalist, private property, wages, etc are all shown to 
be interconnected facets and effects of the social relations and processes entailed by 
capitalist production.  
What can CDA take from this? The critique of political economy is 
fundamentally a critique of its failure to grasp ‘the interconnections within the 
movement’ of social history, social reality. It is a critique of the discourse of political 
economy focused upon its lack of understanding, and consequently its mistaken 
construal, of social relations. From a discourse analytical perspective, Marx’s critique 
of political economy is a critique of the connectivity in its texts: semantic 
relationships between words, argumentative relationships between propositions, 
temporal relationships between processes, syntactic relationships between and within 
sentences, relationships between what is asserted and what is presupposed, etc. What 
it points to is a critical analysis of the whole formal and conceptual architecture and 
texture of political economy texts, focusing on texts as relational work (Fairclough 
2000), texts as producing certain relations and not producing others, as foregrounding 
selected elements of those relations, as well as their being produced from within 
certain relations and not from within others.  
Capital 
Marx’s critique of the political economists is a critique of their failure to go 
beyond appearances in their representation of capitalism and to challenge their own 
presuppositions. The same line of critique is evident in what is generally seen as 
Marx’s most mature and complete work, Capital (1976, 1978, 1981). We comment in 
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particular on the famous analysis in Chapter 1 of the first volume of the ‘fetishism of 
commodities’35.  
Marx points to the ‘enigmatical character of the product of labour’ when it 
‘assumes the form of commodities’:  
The equality of all sorts of human labour is expressed objectively by their products 
being all equally values; the measure of the expenditure of labour power by the 
duration of that expenditure, takes the form of the quantity of value of the products of 
labour; and finally, the mutual relations of the producers, within which the social 
character of their labour affirms itself, takes the form of a social relation between the 
products. (***)  
In the commodity, ‘the social character of men’s labour appears to them as an 
objective character stamped upon the product of that labour … a definite social 
relation between men .. assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between 
things’ (***). Things and their values appear in the place of real social relations, they 
become the appearance of social relations. This is ‘the fetishism of commodities’, 
which has its origins in ‘the peculiar social character of the labour that produces 
them’, i.e. as alienated labour; as labour alienated from its own products (***). To 
producers, ‘the relations connecting the labour of one individual with that of the rest 
appear, not as direct social relations … but as what they really are, material relations 
between persons and social relations between things’ (****).  
The determination of the magnitude of value by labour-time is therefore a secret, 
hidden under the apparent fluctuations in the relative values of commodities. … It 
requires a fully developed production of commodities before, from accumulated 
experience alone, the scientific conviction springs up, that all the different kinds of 
private labour … are continually being reduced to the quantitative proportions in 
which society requires them 
That is, the incommensurable qualities of individuals’ lives are rendered 
commensurable by money, which is also commensurable with all other things.  
The categories of bourgeois economy … are forms of thought expressing with social 
validity the conditions and relations of a definite, historically determined mode of 
production viz the production of commodities. … Political economy has analysed, 
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however incompletely, value and its magnitude, and has discovered what lies beneath 
these forms. But it has never once asked the question why labour is represented by 
the value of its product and labour-time by the magnitude of that value. These 
formulae, which bear it stamped upon them in unmistakable letters that they belong 
to a state of society, in which the process of production has the mastery over man … 
appear to the bourgeois intellect to be as much a self-evident necessity imposed by 
Nature as productive labour itself.   
Marx does not explicitly refer to language here, but he notes elsewhere the similarity 
between language and values. Value is not objective, nor is it inherent in things; 
rather, it is an abstract concept that ‘transforms every product of labour into a social 
hieroglyph’ (Marx, 1976, p. 167). Value and language share a generative source, 
productive human activity: ‘the characteristic which objects of utility have of being 
values is as much men’s social product as is their language’ (1976, p. 167).  We can 
treat this extract as a critique of discourse, both the discourse of everyday life and the 
discourse of the political economists. With respect to the former, the fetishism of 
commodities is a matter of a particular form of consciousness, how ‘the social 
character of men’s labour appears to them’, which arises from ‘the peculiar social 
character’ of their labour. But as the German Ideology puts it, consciousness is always 
‘burdened’ with ‘matter’ – with language. What is at issue here is in contemporary 
terms is the discourse of producers and production.  
With respect to the political economists, Marx’s critique echoes the critique in 
the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts: the ‘formulae’ (a word he also used in 
the earlier text) of political economists appear to them as ‘self-evident’, they do not 
ask ‘why’, they do not delve into the underlying relations to reveal the ‘secret’ of the 
determination of the magnitude of value by labour-time – nor could they, for that 
requires a ‘fully developed production of commodities’, the ‘formulae’ of the political 
economists belong to the ‘state of society’ in which they lived (***). Both the 
fetishistic discourse of producers and the ‘formulae’ of the political economists are 
flawed in failing to grasp underlying relations – and again therefore open to critique of 
what we referred to above as the ‘connectivity’ of texts (and in texts). Thus the 
critique of discourse remains an important part of Marx’s method in Capital, even 
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though explicit engagement with and critique of the texts of the political economists is 
more muted. 
Critique of the Gotha Programme 
A similar conclusion for CDA can be drawn from another of Marx’s mature 
works, the Critique of the Gotha Programme of 1875, the last of Marx’s major 
political critiques, which is a critique of a draft programme of the German Socialist 
Party. We shall focus on the following extract, in which Marx discusses a section of 
the programme which claims that ‘the proceeds of labour’ belong ‘with equal right’ to 
all members of society. He is discussing ‘with equal right’, which he refers to as 
‘ideological nonsense’, with respect to a future socialist society:  
What we have to deal with here is a communist society, not as it has developed on its 
own foundations, but, on the contrary, just as it emerges from capitalist society; 
which is thus in every respect, economically, morally, and intellectually, still 
stamped with the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it emerges. 
Accordingly, the individual producer receives back from society -- after the 
deductions have been made -- exactly what he gives to it. What he has given to it is 
his individual quantum of labor … the same principle prevails as in the exchange of 
commodity equivalents: a given amount of labor in one form is exchanged for an 
equal amount of labor in another form.  
Hence, equal right here is still in principle -- bourgeois right … while the exchange 
of equivalents in commodity exchange exists only on the average and not in the 
individual case … this equal right is still constantly stigmatized by a bourgeois 
limitation. The right of the producers is proportional to the labor they supply; the 
equality consists in the fact that measurement is made with an equal standard, labor.  
But one man is superior to another physically, or mentally, and supplies more labor 
in the same time, or can labor for a longer time; and labor, to serve as a measure, 
must be defined by its duration or intensity, otherwise it ceases to be a standard of 
measurement. This equal right is an unequal right for unequal labor …  it tacitly 
recognizes unequal individual endowment, and thus productive capacity, as a natural 
privilege. It is, therefore, a right of inequality, in its content, like every right. Right, 
by its very nature, can consist only in the application of an equal standard; but 
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unequal individuals (and they would not be different individuals if they were not 
unequal) are measurable only by an equal standard insofar as they are brought under 
an equal point of view, are taken from one definite side only -- for instance, in the 
present case, are regarded only as workers and nothing more is seen in them, 
everything else being ignored. … To avoid all these defects, right, instead of being 
equal, would have to be unequal. 
Marx is arguing that ‘equal rights’ is the application of an ‘equal standard’ of 
measurement, no different from money, which reduces people to mere ‘workers’, to 
abstract labour, ignoring other characteristics of people which affect the work they are 
capable of doing (hence, ‘from each according to their ability; to each according to 
their needs’). The result must be to produce inequality under the ‘bourgeois’, 
‘ideological’, guise of ‘equality’ of ‘rights’. The mistake is falsely rendering the 
incommensurable commensurable by standardised measurements. The (intertextual) 
critique of the appearance of this bourgeois discourse in a socialist programme, and of 
the exclusion from it of ‘the realist outlook’ which had already ‘taken root’ in the 
Party, again centres upon a failure to grasp underlying relationships – between 
‘rights’, ‘standards’, and a reductive equalisation of people to nothing but abstract 
labour. Again, from the perspective of CDA, it is a critique of the conceptual 
architecture and textual connectivity of the discourse. Here we have Marx in a mature 
text engaging in the sort of close textual critique which we saw in the early Economic 
and Philosophic Manuscripts, with fundamentally the same target.  
The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte  
The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte is in contrast to the other texts 
we have discussed an analysis of actual historical events – the process leading to 
Louis Bonaparte’s coup d’etat in France in 1851 – which includes Marx’s analysis of 
how language figured in this socio-political process. We shall begin with the 
celebrated opening passage: 
Hegel remarks somewhere that all facts and personages of great importance in world 
history occur, as it were, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second 
as farce … 
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Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not 
make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly 
encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead 
generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. And just when they 
seem engaged in revolutionising themselves and things, in creating something that 
has never existed. … they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service 
and borrow from them names, battle cries and costumes in order to present the new 
scene of world history in this time-honoured disguise and this borrowed language. 
Thus Luther donned the mask of the Apostle Paul, the revolution of 1789 to 1814 
draped itself alternately as the Roman republic and the Roman empire, and the 
Revolution of 1848 knew nothing better than to parody, now 1789, now the 
revolutionary tradition of 1793 to 1795.   
And later in the text:  
One sees: all ‘idees napoleoniennes’ are ideas of the undeveloped small holding in 
the freshness of its youth; for the small holding that has outlived its day they are an 
absurdity. They are only the hallucinations of its death struggle, words that are 
transformed into phrases, spirits transformed into ghosts.… the parody of the empire  
Revolutions are made in ‘borrowed language’ – ‘language’ in a metaphorical sense, 
but including language in a literal sense. Marx is talking, in Bakhtinian terms, about 
heteroglossia, the heteroglossic or intertextual resources that are drawn from the past 
in the enactment of the present (cf. Fairclough, 1992, ***; Lemke, 1995 ***).  But 
once the ‘sober reality’ and real ‘content’ of the revolution emerge, the borrowed 
‘phrases’ disappear, and new discourses emerge. Thus the French Revolutionaries of 
1789 ‘performed the task of their time in Roman costume and with Roman phrases, 
the task of unchaining and setting up a modern bourgeois society’, a ‘self-deception’ 
in order to ‘conceal from themselves the bourgeois limitations of the content of their 
struggles’. But ‘the new social formation once established, the antediluvian Colossi 
disappeared and with them the resurrected Romanity … Wholly absorbed in the 
production of wealth and peaceful competitive struggle, it no longer comprehended 
that ghosts from the days of Rome had watched over its cradle’.36  
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Marx contrasts these ‘earlier revolutions’ – where the ‘phrase’ (an empty 
shibboleth) conceals the ‘content’ (the meaning, the world historical consequences) –
with the ‘social revolution’ struggled for by the communists, which must ‘arrive at’ its 
‘content’ without ‘superstition with regard to the past’. This is summed up in the 
powerful chiasmus at the end of this extract:   
The social revolution of the nineteenth century cannot draw its poetry from the past, 
but only from the future. It cannot begin with itself before it has stripped off all 
superstition with regard to the past. Earlier revolutions required recollections of past 
world history in order to drug themselves concerning their own content. In order to 
arrive at its own content, the revolution of the nineteenth century must let the dead 
bury their dead. There the phrase went beyond the content; here the content goes 
beyond the phrase. (our italics, ***)  
The contrast between ‘phrase’ and ‘content’, ‘phrase’ and ‘reality’, recurs throughout 
the text. The German word ‘Phrase’ is most often used by Marx in a pejorative way, 
as we can see later in the text:  
And as in private life one differentiates between what a man thinks and says of 
himself and what he really is and does, so in historical struggles one must distinguish 
still more the phrases and fancies of parties from their real organism and their real 
interests, their conception of themselves, from their reality. (***)  
But the relationship between ‘phrase’ and ‘content’ can be more complex. In 
the revolution of 1848, ‘the social republic appeared as a phrase, a prophecy’. It 
‘indicated the general content of the modern revolution’ (i.e. the socialist revolution), 
but it was a content which could not be realised then, because it ‘was in most singular 
contradiction to everything that, with the material available, with the degree of 
education attained by the masses, under the given circumstances and relations, could 
be immediately realised in practice. … In no period to we find a more confused 
mixture of high-flown phrases and actual uncertainty and clumsiness …’. 
Nevertheless the content of ‘social republic’  
haunts the subsequent acts of the drama like a ghost. The democratic republic 
announces its arrival. On June 13 1849, it is dissipated together with its petty 
bourgeois … The parliamentary republic, together with the bourgeoisie, takes 
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possession of the entire stage; it enjoys its existence to the full, but December 2 1851 
buries it to the accompaniment of the anguished cry of the royalists in coalition: 
“Long live the Republic!” … The overthrow of the parliamentary republic … was  
“the victory of Bonaparte over parliament, of the executive power over the legislative 
power, of force without phrases over the force of phrases”.  
The phrase ‘social republic’ was ‘prophetic’ in ‘indicating’ (pointing towards) real 
social revolution. It ‘haunts the subsequent acts of the drama’, however, like ‘a ghost’, 
an insubstantial phrase at odds with the content, being (in contemporary CDA terms) 
successively recontextualized (appropriated but simultaneously transformed) in 
‘democratic republic’ and ‘parliamentary republic’, but its ‘force’ as a phrase at odds 
with content was no match for the ‘force without phrases’ of Bonaparte. 
‘This Bonaparte, who constitutes himself chief of the lumpenproletariat .. is 
the real Bonaparte, the Bonaparte sans phrase’ (***). Here we find Marx describing 
the politics of cynical corporatist populism, the precursor of twentieth century fascism 
(Hobsbawm, 1967, ***; Saul, 1992, ***, 1997, ***). Bonaparte saw through the 
‘borrowed language’: ‘An old crafty roue, he conceives the historical life of the 
nations and their performances of state as comedy in the most vulgar sense, as a 
masquerade where the grand costumes, words and postures merely serve to make the 
pettiest knavery’ (***). Bonaparte sees the “performance”, the mythical farce, of 
bourgeois politics and takes the opportunity to manipulate it. Yet after his ‘victory’, he 
himself falls victim to his own phrases, the elements of his own “ideology”:  
he become(s) the victim of his own conception of the world, the serious buffoon who 
no longer takes world history for a comedy but his comedy for world history. … with 
official phrases about order, religion, family and property in public, before the 
citizens, and with … the society of disorder, prostitution and theft, behind him …  
The real content of a phrase may be ‘revealed’ through experience:  
The defeat of the June insurgents … had shown that in Europe the questions at issue 
are other than that of ‘republic or monarchy’. It had revealed that here bourgeois 
republic signifies the unlimited despotism of one class over other classes. It had 
proved that ….the republic signifies in general only the political form of revolution 
of bourgeois society and not its conservative form of life (104).  
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Forms of consciousness and ‘phrases’ are positioned and positioning – the force of 
their utterance depends upon positions in social relations, in the social hierarchy, both 
for their social validity, and for their (often constitutive) perspective on the 
constitution of society:  
But the democrat, because he represents the petty bourgeoisie, that is, a transition 
class, in which the interests of two classes are simultaneously mutually blunted, 
imagines himself situated above class antagonism generally … they, along with all 
the rest of the nation, form the people. What they represent is the people’s rights; 
what interests them is the people’s interests. Accordingly, when a struggle is 
impending … they merely have to give the signal and the people … will fall upon the 
oppressors (****) 
This is one of a number of instances of free indirect speech in the text – Marx is 
parodying ‘the democrat’ – the italicised phrases (apart from ‘a transition class’) are 
‘the democrat’s’ phrases, phrases which constitute an ‘imaginary’ consciousness 
arising from a ‘transitional’ historical position in class relations.  
The relationship between ‘phrase’ and ‘content’ can be more nuanced than we 
have suggested so far. Marx contrasts the ‘awakening of the dead’ in the 1789 and 
1848 revolutions: “Thus the awakening of the dead in those revolutions” – he means 
the 1789 revolution, as well as the English revolution -  ‘served the purpose of 
glorifying the new struggles, not of parodying the old; of magnifying the given task in 
imagination, not fleeing from its solution in reality; of finding once more the spirit of 
revolution, not making its ghost walk about again’.  Each of these antithetical clauses 
sets 1789 against 1848, and the contrast is made explicit: ‘From 1848 to 1851 only the 
ghost of the old revolution walked about’. So ‘borrowed phrases’ can serve 
constructive and essential purposes in revolutionary struggles even while ‘concealing 
the bourgeois limitations of their content’ – or they can merely summon up ‘ghosts’.  
What is of value here for CDA, especially in the context of a critique of the 
language of the new capitalism? Marx shows how revolutions (and counter-
revolutions) ‘borrow’ their ‘language’ from the past – in the terms of CDA, it is a 
recognition of social heteroglossia, of intertextuality, of how change involves the 
selective recontextualisation and interdiscursive appropriation of existing (past) 
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discourses, and of this as a process which is socially positioned, relative to different 
social positionings. There is an ambivalence about this process: while it conceals the 
‘content’ beneath the ‘phrase’, Marx suggests that it may either be a positive and 
necessary recourse for ‘finding once more the spirit of revolution’, or conversely a 
mere ‘parody’, a ‘ghost’. Derrida (1994) questions Marx’s confident claim that social 
revolutions are/will be different: Marx points to the way in which the phrases of the 
past continue to ‘haunt’ the present, as the phrases of Marxism ‘haunt’ us today – can 
we really expect an end to this?  
The economic transformations of today – which appear to have the character 
of a counter-revolution against welfare state capitalism – certainly do not borrow the 
heroic language of ‘Romanity’, but they do nevertheless conceal their ‘content’ in 
‘phrases’ from ‘borrowed languages’, especially that of the “golden age” of 
capitalism, much of which is, in turn, ‘borrowed’ from scholastic dogma and 
mercantilist rhetoric (Graham, in press). 37 For instance, the language of ‘individual 
freedom’ which is applied not only to the ‘freedom’ of people as ‘consumers’ ‘to 
choose’ from the unprecedented range of ‘choice’, the provision of which capital not 
infrequently represents as its raison d’etre, but also for instance with more obvious 
cynicism to the ‘freedom’ which people gain from  a market which is increasingly 
demanding part-time and short-term workers. Of course critiques of such ideological 
language are common in CDA, but what Marx valuably emphasizes is that the 
ideological ‘force’ of such ‘phrases’ comes from their potency in historical 
consciousness in memory – it was the power of the memory of the first French 
revolution and the first Napoleon which gave the ‘phrases’ of the second their force.  
Marx and CDA 
What can CDA learn from Marx’s critique of discourse? Some aspects of 
Marx’s critique are already familiar within CDA – for instance, his ‘transformational 
criticism’ of texts of Hegel in which the focus is Hegel’s idealist attribution of agency 
to ‘the idea’:  
‘The idea is made the subject and the actual relation of family and civil society to the 
state is conceived as its internal imaginary activity. Family and civil society are the 
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premises of the state; they are the genuinely active elements, but in speculative 
philosophy things are inverted’ (Marx, 1843/1975, p. ***).  
The critique of texts in terms of their representations of agency is a central concern of 
‘critical linguistics’ and CDA. Also, Marx’s view of language as just one element in 
the productive activity of social life, always dialectically interconnected with others as 
an ever-present moment and aspect of the production [meant here in the broadest 
possible sense to include all human activity] and reproduction of social forms  
(consciousness, physical activity, institutionalised forms) has certainly received some 
(if so far insufficient) development within CDA (eg Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999; 
Graham 1999). So too the recognition that different discourses are tied to different 
positions within given systems of social relations – though Marx’s stress on the 
development of discourses as conditional upon stages of development of systems of 
social relations and production adds a crucial historical dimension to the positionality 
of discourses.  
In the commentary on selected texts above, however, we have focused on what 
we have referred to as the ‘connectivity’ in texts; relations, contradictions, and 
tensions between elements. We see the critique of texts in these terms as firstly tied to 
materialist view of texts as a modality of social production, but secondly dependent 
upon methods of analysing texts which are so far underdeveloped (Fairclough 2000). 
Hitherto, text analysis in CDA as elsewhere has been limited by theories of language 
which focus on the sentence, and tend to see texts in terms of extensions of the 
grammar of the sentence. We need ways of seeing and analysing texts as processes, as 
work, as ‘working up’ specific relations between elements to the exclusion of other 
possible relations – semantic, conceptual and classificatory relationships between 
words, logical relationships between propositions, temporal relationships between 
processes, syntactic relationships between and within sentences, relationships between 
what is asserted and what is presupposed, and so forth. This ‘work’ of texts is closely 
integrated within the productive activities of social life (Halliday, 1993, p. 8), it 
dialectally internalises other facets of these productive activities and is dialectically 
internalised within them, while nevertheless remaining a distinctively discoursal 
process which needs to be grasped in terms of its own logic, as well as its connection 
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with others. Marx does not of course say any of this (perhaps because he doesn’t see 
discourse/text/language as separate from the rest of human existence), but his critical 
method includes a sophisticated, developmental critique of discourse that calls for it.  
Developing CDA in this direction is not a purely ‘academic’ challenge. A 
widely noted feature of contemporary social life is its ‘fragmentation’, and a widely 
noted obstacle to formulating alternatives to the new capitalism is its opacity as 
system which goes with and is sustained by that fragmentation. This opacity is not 
lessened merely by awareness of its existence. There is surely truth still in Marx’s 
insight that it takes a certain level of development of the new system of social, a 
certain accumulation of experience, to be able to see the relations which underlie its 
appearances and to go beyond these. From this point of view, if CDA is to engage in 
the critique of language in the new capitalism, we need to be in tune with the most 
developed work in contemporary political economy and other political and social 
sciences. Nevertheless, unlike in Marx’s time, the visibility of the system to those who 
live within it, suffer from it, and would wish to change it, is conditioned by elaborate 
networks of mediation.  
The task is not only a critique of our own ‘bourgeois economists’, but also a 
critique of our government agencies, our armies of ‘experts’ (including academics), 
our ‘news’, our “entertainment”, our corporations, and so forth. But connectivity and 
the relational logic thereof is a focal concern throughout. Just to take one banal 
example: the defence of the spokesperson for a company accused on one of the many 
‘consumer affairs’ slots within the media of producing foods for children which 
damage their health: ‘Our concern is to ensure that parents have a wide choice’.  
‘Choice’ appears pervasively as what Marx might have called an ‘empty phrase’ 
whose emptiness comes from its confinement to ‘appearances’, its abstract and 
equivocal nature, the historical baggage it carries, and crucially the failure of indeed 
many contemporary discourses to register underlying relationships which connect 
‘choice’ to relations of production, extortion, and monopoly, rather than just 
fragmented (and frenzied) consumption.  
Marx as discourse analyst 
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On one level it is simply anachronistic to suggest that Marx was a discourse 
analyst. Discourse analysis did not exist in his time. On another level however it is a 
claim that has some substance: Marx’s view of language and mode of language 
critique are similar to those of some contemporary critical discourse analysts.  
Let us finally try to justify this claim about his view of language by referring to 
a section of the Grundrisse, from the Chapter on Money (142 ff in Penguin edition):  
Every moment, in calculating, accounting etc., that we transform commodities into 
value symbols, we fix them as mere exchange values, making abstraction from the 
matter they are composed of and all their natural qualities. On paper, in the head, this 
metamorphosis proceeds by mere abstraction; but in the real exchange process a real 
mediation is required, a means to accomplish this abstraction. ... In the crudest barter, 
when two commodities are exchanged for one another, each is first equated with a 
symbol which expresses their exchange value, e.g. among certain Negroes on the 
West African coast, = x bars. One commodity is = 1 bar; the other = 2 bars. They are 
exchanged in this relation. The commodities are first transformed into bars in the 
head and in speech before they are exchanged for one another. They are appraised 
before being exchanged, and in order to appraise them they must be brought into a 
given numerical relation to one another ... In order to determine what amount of 
bread I need in order to exchange it for a yard of linen, I first equate the yard of linen 
with its exchange value, i.e. = 1/x hours of labour time. Similarly, I equate the pound 
of bread with its exchange value, = 1/x or 2/x hours of labour time. I equate each of 
the commodities with a third; i.e. not with themselves. This third, which differs from 
them both, exists initially only in the head, as a conception, since it expresses a 
relation; just as, in general, relations can be established as existing only by being 
thought, as distinct from the subjects which are in these relations with each other. ….   
For the purpose of merely making a comparison – an appraisal of products – of 
determining their value ideally, it suffices to make this transformation in the head (a 
transformation in which the product exists merely as the expression of quantitative 
relations of production). This abstraction will do for comparing commodities; but in 
actual exchange this abstraction in turn must be objectified, must be symbolized, 
realized in a symbol. … (Such a symbol presupposes general recognition; it can only 
be a social symbol; it expresses, indeed, nothing more than a social relation.) … The 
process, then, is simply this: The product becomes a commodity, i.e. a mere moment 
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of exchange. The commodity is transformed into exchange value. In order to equate it 
with itself as an exchange value, it is exchanged for a symbol which represents it as 
exchange value as such. As such a symbolized exchange value, it can then in turn be 
exchanged in definite relations for every other commodity. Because the product 
becomes a commodity, and the commodity becomes an exchange value, it obtains, at 
first only in the head, a double existence. This doubling in the idea proceeds (and 
must proceed) to the point where the commodity appears double in real exchange: as 
a natural product on one side, as exchange value on the other. I.e. the commodity's 
exchange value obtains a material existence separate from the commodity.  
 (The material in which this symbol is expressed is by no means a matter of 
indifference, even though it manifests itself in many different historical forms. In the 
development of society, not only the symbol but likewise the material corresponding 
to the symbol are worked out -- a material from which society later tries to 
disentangle itself; if a symbol is not to be arbitrary, certain conditions are demanded 
of the material in which it is represented. The symbols for words, for example the 
alphabet etc., have an analogous history.) 
There is a dialectical view of discourse as one element of social life in this extract. 
Money ‘expresses a relation’, relations ‘can be established as existing only by being 
thought’, but the relation of value is only ‘established’ by thought when people begin 
to engage in exchange (eg barter). While the value relation continues to work as an 
‘abstraction’, a relation established ‘in the head and in speech’ and ‘on paper’, in the 
appraisal of products, for the actual exchange of commodities the ‘abstraction’ must 
be ‘objectified’, ‘symbolized, realized in a symbol’ – ‘exchange value obtains a 
material existence separate from the commodity’. This is a constitutive view of 
discourse: discourse shapes the development of ‘real exchange’ as the value relation, a 
relation in thought/speech – a discourse – becomes ‘objectified’. It is not however an 
idealist view of discourse, but a dialectical one: ‘real exchange’ shapes the 
development of discourse - it is only at a certain stage in the development of ‘real 
exchange’ that the value relation is ‘established in thought’ – which shapes the 
development of ‘real exchange’. The constitutive work of discourse is not viewed 
idealistically as ideas being realized in material reality: the value relation as an 
‘abstraction’ is already material - language is the ‘matter’ which the mind is ‘burdened 
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with’, as the German Ideology put it – and the ‘abstraction’ is ‘objectified’ as a 
‘symbol’, itself a synthesis of idea and matter. Moreover, there is a non-arbitrary 
relationship between money as a symbol and ‘the material in which this symbol is 
expressed’ – it has to be ‘divisible at will’, for instance.  
Conclusion 
We claim that Marx was a discourse theorist avant la lettre because he had a 
discourse view of language as one element of social life which is dialectically 
interconnected with others, and an element which is thoroughly present in the 
dialectical movement between consciousness, ‘real exchange’, and material (in the 
sense of physical) existence overall. Marx was also a discourse analyst avant la lettre 
because he put this dialectical view of discourse to work in his economic, political and 
historical analyses. Perhaps in one sense he was a better discourse analyst than many 
of us are now: although his work does not obviously stand up well to contemporary 
expectations (in linguistics journal articles, for instance) of a sustained and systematic 
focus on language, nor does it suffer from the reifying and idealizing consequences of 
abstracting language from the social process, if only to connect it back to the social 
process in analysis. 
But perhaps the clearest message that Marx has left us as discourse analysts is 
that we must analyse the relationships that characterise this period as unique, the 
relationships that define it as such: Are we even living in capitalist societies; or, have 
the relationships that characterise this period changed so drastically from those of the 
recent past as to make the new global system definable as “something else”, as a 
“new” economy, a “post” capitalist society? What are the implications of global 
organisations, both of the entrepreneurial (i.e. transnational corporations) and 
governmental (WTO, IMF, ILO, OECD, EU, etc) kind? What are their relationships? 
What are the consequences of predominating global “shareholder” capitalism, “social 
capital” in Marx’s words? What does the waning of national power mean for people 
from different walks of life? What does it mean for democracy? How do new media 
change the kinds of relationships and representations that we can and do have? How 
do we interact to do what we do (productive activity), and how does this define our 
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social roles and institutions? What do we value and how? These are merely some of 
the questions left to us by Marx. These are the challenges for CDA.   
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1 That said, there are clearly elements of, for instance, The German Ideology, where Marx is clearly 
concerned with showing the role of ‘metadiscursive regulation’ imposed by classical political economy 
and political theory in the name of vested interests supporting the Natural Order (see below, Ideology).  
2 While much is made of Feurbach’s materialist influence on Marx, we concur with Colletti (1975, p. 
24) that to overstate the case is ‘naïve’. Marx was an avowed Aristotlean, and as such thoroughly 
familiar with Aristotle’s thought, as well as that of the ancient Greeks in general (Fenves, 1986, p. 433). 
Feurbach’s move, while clearly approved of by Marx, was merely another variation on ‘one of the most 
profound and ancient themes in philosophical history, and recurs constantly in the debate between 
Idealism and Materialism’ (Colletti, 1975, p. 24). We can assume that Marx was quite aware of all this, 
well before Feurbach formulated his abstract materialist theses against neo-Hegelianism (cf. Fenves, 
1986). 
3 Aristotle used the terms “aphairesis” and “korismos” which he used in different ways to describe the 
process of concept formation by abstracting form from matter (Weinberg, p. 1). The term ‘abstaction’ is 
again a contibution of the scholastics.  
4 The primary concern of both Plato and Aristotle was to explain how it was that people were able to 
consider, in universal terms, the properties of an object – a  brass ring for instance – and consider 
“circularity” as a universal property without taking into account any other sensuous aspects of the 
matter. For Aristotle, abstraction is the method by which people come to know Universal characteristics 
of categories, such as the mathematical characteristics of ‘circle’ or ‘triangle’ (Weinberg, 1968, p. 2). 
Abstraction rests on the assumption that the abstracted forms [formal] elements of matter, as such, exist 
only in the mind, and that these are the ‘fundamental elements of thought which are the referents of the 
verbal elements of spoken discourse’ (p. 2). 
5 Even though Kant’s debt to the scholastic doctrine is negative in this respect. 
6 Those more familiar with Aristotle might well argue that his concept of abstraction was not static in 
the first place, and that the scholastic influence has more to do with this. While the point is clearly 
arguable, here is not the place to take that argument up. We can note, though, that as well as treating 
‘substance’ or ‘essence’ in terms of abstraction, Aristotle also treats causes in the same way (1998, pp. 
440-452), although this remains an undeveloped aspect of The Metaphysics. “OK. OK. Enough 
examples of what happens on this theory. Many more could be marshalled, but enough. The endless, 
endless difficulties about production, the total non-obtaining of any mode of schematizing, which afflict 
Form numbers are surely plausibly construed as a sign. They are a sign that [abstractions] DO NOT 
EXIST IN SEPARATION FROM PERCEPTIBLE OBJECTS (as widely advertised) and that 
PRINCIPLES OF THIS KIND GIBT ES NICHT” (Aristotle, 1998, p. 452).  
7 We note with a sense of irony that such a view is now widely adopted by techno-fetishists throughout 
the developed world. Its expression can be seen in such terms as “knowledge economy” and “perfect 
information” (cf. Graham 2000).  
8 We note here that abstraction is not necessarily a perjorative term, either in Marx or anywhere else. 
For Marx, it is how we predispose ourselves to our own abstractions (e.g. our attitudes to religion) that 
make them more or less damaging.  
9 Readers familiar with Bourdieu (e.g. 1990, 1991, 1998) will be familiar with the concept, if not its 
foundation.  
10 There is absolutely no foundation whatsoever for suggesting that Marx held a conception of class as a 
static immutable “substance” that properly belongs to a particular group of people. According to Marx, 
even at its most well-developed, ‘class articulation does not emerge in pure form … From this point of 
view … doctors and government officials would also form two classes, as they belong to two distinct 
social groups … The same would hold true for the infinite fragmentation of interests and positions into 
which the division of social labour splits (Marx, 1981, p. 1025-1026, emphasis added). Class, like 
capital, is not a “thing”; it is the dynamic result of things people do.   
11 Entia have four aspects –as Accident, as Truth of Falsehood, as Potential or Actual, or as 
Categorically defined subject matters – but are ‘not species under a common genus’, neither are they in 
‘co-ordinate’ [paratactic/co-meronymous] or ‘subordinate’ [hypotactic/co-hyponymous] relationships 
(Grote, 1872, p. 86). They merely have ‘a relationship with a common term’ [the fundamentum or ‘First 
Essence’ or Subject] but ‘no other necessary relation with each other’ (p. 86). For the dialectic, 
however, it is the last of these aspects of Entia that concern us, that which is defined under the ten 
Categories outlined by Aristotle, to be outlined presently, and in which Aristotle ‘appears to blend 
Logic and Ontology into one’ (p. 88). 
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12 Aritotle’s ten categories were reduced, via a multitude of historical interpretations, to ‘four principle 
Categories –Substance, Quantity, Quality, and Relation’, yet ‘[e]ven these four cannot be kept clearly 
apart: the predicates which declare Quantity or Quality at the same time declare Relation; while the 
predicates of Relation must also imply the fundamentum either of Quantity or of Quality’ (Grote, 1872, 
p. 129). 
13 In CDA, such a group is called a ‘discourse community’ (cf. Fairclough, ***; Graham and McKenna, 
2000; Lemke, 1995, ***).   
 
14  Those familiar with critical theory will recognise contemporary notions and definitions of “ideology” 
and “hegemony” in the definitions of Endoxa. 
15 Dialectic does not proceed from first principles. Rather, its purpose is to ‘open a new road to the first 
principia of each separate science’ (p. 391). In any case, the first principia of a science ‘can never be 
scrutinized through the truths of the science itself, which presuppose them and are deduced from them’ 
(p. 391, our emphasis). 
16 Propositions and problems fall under four Heads, or categories, which are types of predicates that 
belong to the subject matter (Ens or Entia): Genus and Differentia; and Proprium or Accident (Grote, 
1872, p. 398). Aristotle defines ‘four sorts of matters (Entia)’ which are distinguished ‘in reference to 
their functions as constituent members of propositions’ (p. 83): that which is part of the subject matter 
[essential predicate]; that which is ‘affirmable of a Subject’ but is not actually part of the subject matter 
[non-essential predicate]; that which is ‘both in a Subject and affirmable of a Subject’ [essence]; and 
that which is neither part of a subject nor affirmable of it [accident] (p. 83). Ens ‘is not a synonymous or 
univocal word’ (p. 84), it is, rather, ‘multivocal … having many meanings held together by multifarious 
and graduated relationship to one common fundamentum’ (pp. 84-85). 
17 The specific type of essence or Ens with which Aristotle’s dialectic is concerned is the form in which 
Ens is defined most completely: ‘Ens, in its complete state—concrete, individual, determinate—
includes an embodiment of all these ten Categories; the First Ens being the Subject of which the rest are 
Predicates’ (Grote, 1872, p. 93). Anything which may be said about a subject, according to Aristotle, 
must fall ‘under one or more of these ten general heads; while the full outfit of the individual will 
comprise some predicate under each of them’ (p. 93). These categories – which Aristotle suggests are 
exhaustive –  are 1) Essence or Substance; 2) How Much; 3) What Manner or Quality; 4) Ad Aliquid - 
in relation to something [Relatum and Correlatum]; 5) Where; 6) When; 7) In what posture (How); 8) 
To have (attributes);  9) Activity (what is the subject doing); 10) Passivity (what is being done to the 
subject) (p. 93). Each of these categories has ‘more or fewer species contained under it, but not being 
itself contained under any larger genus (Ens not being a genus)’ (p. 94). 
18 The difference between what is in, or part of a subject, and what is predicated of (i.e. logically 
follows from, or naturally associated with) the subject depends entirely on the actual relationships 
between a “subject” and its “predicates”, and, in a formal sense, this turns on the grammatical status of 
the predicate (Grote, 1872, p. 91). Such sensitivity to linguistic, grammatical, and discursive subtlety 
ought not be overlooked in Marx’s most favoured classical scholar (Fenves, 1986, p. 433), especially 
when Marx makes much of how humanity tends to objectify its linguistic abstractions and place 
particular of them “in charge” of society (e.g. God, the Church, Money, The Market, “Globalisation”, 
Technolgy, etc). The linguistic tendency towards “thinginess” is, as Adorno (1973, p. 56) and Halliday 
(1993, p. 11) quite rightly point out, a function and tendency of language-in-use. As such, it goes 
directly to the foundations of dialectic method. 
19 Thomas Jefferson translated De Tracy’s Elemens de Ideologie into English in 1816. 
20 Kennedy points out that Marx considered Tracy, because of his ‘labour theory of value’ and his 
theory of the “concours de forces”, ‘to a certain point a light among the vulgar economists’ (in 
Kennedy, 1979, p. 376). However, Kennedy ignores Marx’s scathing comments directed towards Tracy 
in Vol 2 of capital (1978, p. ***).  
21 Kennedy is concerned to emphasise that Tracy was a materialist. Even though his Ideology contained 
‘a strain of idealism’, this was ‘virtually nullified’ by Tracy’s fundamental conception of ideology as 
part of ‘zoology’. It is also nullified for Kennedy by the fact that Tracy set himself in opposition to the 
idealisms of  Malebranche and Berkeley (1979, p. 364).  
22 These are Latin terms developed by the scholastics, although their pedigree is clearly Aristotlean 
(Lawson-Tancred, 1998, pp. xxx-xxxi).  
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23 Today, the use of authoritative quotations as the basis of arguments is conventional. In Marx’s day, 
argument from authority was considered to be the weakest form of argumentation. His manner of using 
quotes in Capital, we think, indicates that by the time Marx wrote Capital, he felt he had argued out a 
sufficiently developed and entirely new apprroach to political economy by means of his earlier 
dialectical “counter syllogising”. It is such an unusual method of using quotes that in the preface to the 
third edition of Capital, Engels feels the need to explain ‘Marx’s manner of quoting, which is so little 
understood’ (in Marx, 1976, p. 108).  
24 Aristotle details four ‘helps’ for proceeding with dialectical engagement. The dialectician must: 
i)‘have a large collection of propositions’ on the subject; ii) ‘study and discriminate the different senses 
in which the Terms of these proposition are used’;  iii) ‘detect and note Differences’; and iv) 
‘investigate Resemblances’ (Grote, 1872, p. 401). On the first point, propositions may be collected ‘out 
of written treatises as well as from personal enquiry’. If the proposition  is ‘currently admitted as true in 
general or in most cases, it must be tendered ... as a universal principle’ (p. 401). In fact, ‘[a]ll 
propositions must be registered in the most general terms possible, and must then be resolved into their 
subordinate constitute particulars, as far as the process of subdivision can be carried’ (p. 402). On the 
second protocol, terms must be investigated for ‘Equivocation’ because, often, they have different, 
double, or multiple meanings in common usage; their usage and therefore their predicates may differ 
vastly (p. 402). On the third and fourth protocols, terms must be studied for Differences and 
Resemblances because terms that seem closely allied may, because of their usage or equivocation, have 
vastly different meanings. Conversely, ‘subjects of great apparent difference’ may bear resemblance for 
precisely the same reason: context of usage; if the different meanings of terms are not known, then 
dialecticians ‘cannot know clearly’ what they are saying (p. 406). The third and fourth ‘helps’, the 
investigation of Differences [Differentia] and Resemblances amongst predicates, are useful for 
ascertaining, in the case of Differences, ‘the essence or definition of any thing; for we ascertain this by 
exclusion of what is foreign thereunto, founded on the appropriate differences in each case’ (p. 407). 
From Resemblances, we can inductively derive counter-syllogisms: from the ‘repetition of similar 
particulars a universal is obtained’, and we are ‘entitled to assume as an Endoxon or doctrine 
conformable to common opinion, that what happens to any one’ element in a string of similar cases 
‘will also happen to the rest’. On these bases, we can develop the major proposition of a counter-
syllogism, an assertion that contradicts the endoxic thesis. 
25 It might well be argued that “family” etc are abstractions, and rightly so. But Marx explicates his 
materialist formulation shortly thereafter: ‘… men [sic], who daily remake their own life, begin to make 
other men, to propagate their kind: the relationship between man and woman, parents and children. The 
family, which to begin with is the only social relationship, becomes later, when increased needs create 
new social relations and the increased population new needs, a subordinate one …, and must then be 
treated and analysed according to the existing empirical data, not according to “the concept of the 
family,” as is the custom in Germany’ (Marx, 1846/1972, pp. 120-121).   
26 This point is made most clearly in The German Ideology (1846/1972), wherein Marx identifies ‘the 
language of real life’ as ‘the material activity and the material intercourse of men’ (1846/1972, p. 118). 
27 Grote calls this method a form of ‘Sokratic brachiology’ because of the branching, relational 
complexity that such an aproach entails. 
28 “Organic”, we propose, is best understood here as “instrumental and essential constituents”, in this 
case, of “the state, the political consitution”. That is why Marx says that, in Hegel, the ‘organic is the 
Idea of the the differences and their ideal determination’, but that ‘their reality is organic’: the 
relationships that constitute the state – family, civil sentiment, social institutions, political sentiment, 
political institutions, etc – are the state’s essential elements; they are functionally, antagonistically, and 
instrumentally related to the state and are inseparable from it; they both define and create the state, and 
are thus its organic constituents. 
29 Throughout the whole of his work, Marx’s method is marked by a “working out” process in his texts. 
For instance, ‘when Marx wrote the Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State he had not yet arrived at 
theoretical communism. He arrived at this goal in the course of writing it’ (Colletti, 1975, p. 45).  
30 Note here the sensitivity to nominalisation and its implications which “goes without saying”: the 
person who accepts “intuiton”, a nominalised thing, has already presupposed an abstraction from real 
activity, intuiting. 
31 In introducing Excerpts, Colletti (1975, p. 259) notes that 84 quotes have been edited from the 
original manuscript. Thirteen remain in the text. 
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32 “Accidental” here is meant in the formal Aristotlean sense; i.e. it could belong to other forms of 
social organisation, but it is construed by Adam Smith et al as deliberately deployed by capitalists to 
break up the monopolies of mercantilist states (see Smith, 1776, pp. ***). 
33 ‘No land without a master’.  
34 It is worth noting what Marx means by “property”: he means the proerty rights that stem from legal 
rights in land, to which ‘capital is welded’ (***). “Property ownership” should not be confused with 
simple possession, a mistake of communists, socialists, conservatives, and liberals of all stripes. 
35 Marx’s use of the fetish concept is central in his critique of alienation and can be traced to his earliest 
work, in particular his critique of religion. In his critique of political economy, the concept is worked up 
throughout, from Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts onwards: ‘It is the same in religion. The 
more man puts into God, the less he retains within himself. The worker places his life in the object; but 
now the object no longer belongs to him, but to the object. The greater his activity, therefore, the fewer 
objects the worker possesses. What the product of his labour is, he is not’ (1844/1975, p. 324).  
36  On ‘ghost’, ‘spirit’, etc metaphors in Marx, see Derrida (1994). 
37 This is especially so where the discourse of “choice” is concerned. It has its historical content in the 
State’s urge to dispense with church doctrine against usury. Interestingly, it was Aristotle’s concept of 
‘free will’ - today evolved into “rational choice” theory - that was firstly decisive in bringing church 
prohibitions against usury to the status of a lesser sin (Langholm, 1998, p. 74). The scholastics first 
shifted the burden of sin, by a dubious twist of one of Aristotle’s comments (‘Forced will is will’), from 
the person who lent money to the person who borrowed it: ‘One who pays usury does so voluntarily in 
the same sense in which one jettisons cargo when in peril at sea can be said to act voluntarily, namely, 
in the sense that he prefers to lose his property rather than his life’ (p. 74). Thus, a newly distorted 
conception of “free will”, and thus of “free” choice, became currency for mainstream economic thought 
and has remained so ever since. Marx quite rightly savages this particularly perverse discourse of false 
freedom (e.g. Marx, 1976, p. 280, chapt. 28). 
